Structuring Reality So That the Law Will Follow: British Columbia Teachers\u27 Quest for Collective Bargaining Rights by Slinn, Sara
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
2011
Structuring Reality So That the Law Will Follow:
British Columbia Teachers' Quest for Collective
Bargaining Rights
Sara Slinn
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, sslinn@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Slinn, Sara. "Structuring Reality So That the Law Will Follow: British Columbia Teachers' Quest for Collective Bargaining Rights."
Labour/Le Travail 68 (2011): 35-77.
Structuring Reality So That the Law Will Follow: 
British Columbia Teachers’ Quest  
for Collective Bargaining Rights
Sara Slinn
Introduction
The British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (bctf), representing all 
public elementary and secondary school teachers in the province, is one of the 
largest and most powerful unions in British Columbia (BC). From the early 
days of its existence, bctf has sought to negotiate a full array of issues on behalf 
of teachers, and do so with an unrestricted ability to strike at the individual 
school district (or local) level. It has employed a sustained, sophisticated series 
of strategies to achieve these objectives, quickly adapting to changing political 
and legal environments. The bctf has had significant success in advancing its 
labour relations agenda, establishing a different trajectory for teachers than 
for most public sector workers in Canada. 
The experience of public sector unions in BC is often characterized as a 
series of struggles against repressive, right-wing provincial governments. BC 
has certainly had a series of overtly anti-worker and anti-union governments, 
first under the Social Credit (Socred) Party and, since 2001, the Liberals. 
However, bctf’s conflict and struggle has spanned virtually every government 
in this province from the time of W.A.C. Bennett’s Socreds to today, includ-
ing the labour-friendly New Democratic Party (ndp) and the current Liberal 
government.
The perspective this article takes is that this experience is rooted in bctf’s 
determination to achieve and exercise full labour relations rights and obtain 
the collective agreement benefits accruing from the bargaining power that it 
has developed, contrasted with the fundamental difficulty government faces 
article 
Sara Slinn, “Structuring Reality So That the Law Will Follow: British Columbia Teachers’ Quest 
for Collective Bargaining Rights,” Labour/Le Travail, 68 (Fall 2011), 35–77.
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in providing public services with limited resources. It is essentially a practi-
cal and pragmatic dispute, rather than an ideological conflict. Therefore this 
article maps bctf’s strategies, struggles, achievements and setbacks in its 
labour relations agenda against the backdrop of the political and legal environ-
ments, and the actions and responses of successive BC governments.
This article begins by laying out the characteristics of public sector labour 
relations relevant to this history. It then reviews the accepted developmental 
stages of Canadian public sector labour relations, and offers a different account 
of BC teachers’ experience. Each of these periods of development in BC teach-
ers’ labour relations experience is examined.1 A final section addresses the 
recurring themes appearing in bctf’s labour relations strategies.
Public Sector Labour Relations 
Government’s role in public sector labour relations is complicated by 
two sets of dualities. First, government is responsible to public employees, as 
their ultimate employer. But it is also responsible to the public to protect its 
welfare and be accountable.  Both sets of responsibilities shape government’s 
role and its labour relations responses, and Swimmer and Thompson charac-
terize this dichotomy as “by far the most intriguing element of public sector 
management.”2 These often conflicting responsibilities, and the decisions they 
demand about allocating limited public resources and protecting the public 
from unreasonable harm from labour disputes, while preserving a legitimate 
and functioning collective bargaining system in the public sector, produce 
dilemmas underlying much of government intervention in public sector col-
lective bargaining.
The nature and extent of public service provision is being transformed as 
governments rethink their role as public service providers and shift towards 
creating an environment fostering provision of services rather than provid-
ing these services directly. Thompson and Jalette suggest that the practical 
constraints of recent recessionary periods have reinforced this redefinition 
of governments role.3 This shift is also occurring in public primary and 
1. This research includes confidential semi-structured interviews with several key infor-
mants, conducted between winter 2008 and spring 2011. These include past bctf Presidents 
Irene Lanzinger (2007–10), Jinny Sims (2004–07), and Larry Kuehn (1981–84, currently 
bctf Director of Research and Technology); British Columbia Public School Employers’ 
Association’s Chief Executive Officer, Hugh Finlayson;  Kenneth Halliday, a labour relations 
expert who has negotiated on behalf of school boards; and an anonymous interviewee who has 
also negotiated for school boards.
2. Gene Swimmer and Mark Thompson, “Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: An 
Introduction,” in Gene Swimmer and Mark Thompson, eds., Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
(Kingston 1995), 1–19, 6.
3. Mark Thompson and Patrice Jalette, “Public Sector Collective Bargaining,” in Morley 
Gunderson, Allen Ponak, and Daphne G. Taras, eds., Canadian Labour Relations: 
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secondary education. In the context of recommendations for federal civil 
service reorganization, Fryer describes this as government now “steering, not 
rowing” the boat.4 While government’s dual responsibilities may be the most 
intriguing aspect of public sector labour relations, government’s power to leg-
islate is its most defining feature. This allows government to set the rules for 
public sector labour relations and to change them at will. This is particularly 
so where the governing party holds a great majority, as has recently been the 
case in BC. The labour relations system was constructed on the premise that 
government would act as “honest brokers, intervening on behalf of the public 
good.”5 However, as several scholars point out, governments have abandoned 
this neutrality, becoming partisan actors mixing their managerial and gover-
nance functions, and are frequently unable to resist the temptation to exercise 
legislative power to reset labour relations rules to favour their managerial 
interests.6
Governments in Canada have a long history of frequently using their leg-
islative power to directly intervene in public sector labour relations. This has 
often included ad hoc legislation ending labour disputes with back to work 
legislation, commonly imposing collective agreement terms, or directing 
parties to interest arbitration. Also common have been legislative restrictions 
on the scope of public sector collective bargaining, removing issues from the 
bargaining table and converting them into unilaterally determined matters of 
public policy. Panitch and Swartz refer to this as a trend from temporary mea-
sures to “permanent exceptionalism” where state intrusion, to the repeated 
detriment of labour, has become increasingly normalized.7
However, an important change to the legal environment of public sector 
labour relations is the 2007 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Health 
Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 
Columbia.8 This decision has reduced the availability of such legislative 
Understanding Union-Management Challenges and Choices, 6th ed. (Toronto 2008), 403–429, 
427. 
4. Canada, Advisory Committee on Labour Management Relations in the Federal Public 
Service, Working Together in the Public Interest (Ottawa 2001), 10.
5. Bernard Adell, Michel Grant, and Allen Ponak, Strikes in Essential Services (Kingston 2001), 
2.
6. Adell et al, Strikes in Essential Services, 2; Allen Ponak and Mark Thompson, “Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining,” in Morley Gunderson, Allen Ponak, and Daphne Taras, eds., Union-
management Relations in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto 2005), 414–443, 426–7. 
7. Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union 
Freedoms, 3rd ed. (Toronto 2003), 27–8.
8. Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
2007 scc 27; Eric Tucker, “The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies 
of Labour History in the Supreme Court of Canada,” Labour/Le Travail, 61 (Spring  2008),  
151–180.
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tools. The Court redefined the Charter protection of freedom of association 
to include a right to the process of collective bargaining such that the right 
will be violated where state action constitutes “substantial inference” with 
collective bargaining. The scope and shape of this right will also be limited 
in certain contexts of “exigency and urgency.”9 This is a tremendous change 
because, previously, the Court had consistently and emphatically ruled that 
the Charter guarantee of freedom of association did not extend to either col-
lective bargaining or strike activity.
Although the full implications of this decision remain to be determined, 
it clearly indicates that governments will be at risk of violating public sector 
workers’ Charter-guaranteed freedom of association by passing legislation 
that imposes collective agreement terms, removes negotiated provisions from 
collective agreements, or removes certain matters from the scope of nego-
tiations, absent exigent and urgent circumstances. As this article will show, 
governments in BC have frequently relied on legislative intervention of these 
types in the past to deal with teacher bargaining. This new limitation requires 
governments to rethink their dependence on legislative intervention.
Also relevant to teacher labour relations in BC is the role of media. Public 
sector labour relations has been described as “an exercise in political, not eco-
nomic, power” with political considerations often as important as financial 
factors.10 These political considerations create incentives for both parties to 
try to use the media in disputes, such that negotiations occur, in part, in the 
media in a contest over public opinion. Gunderson and Reid also note that 
strikes offer public sector unions a possible advantage, as a “strike (or threat 
of a strike) removes an asymmetry in access to the media. Governments can 
usually get media coverage for their views very easily while a public sector 
union has to pay for its propaganda – it can get free coverage only in a 
crisis.”11 Media also influences how parties frame their demands. Teachers, 
for instance, generally cast demands in terms of improved education rather 
than higher salaries and better working conditions, while government frames 
its demands and actions in terms of protecting the public interest. This often 
involves representing public workers as privileged and shielded from the eco-
nomic hardships affecting those in the private sector.12 
9. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11; Health Services, para. 107.
10. Swimmer and Thompson, “Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector,” 2; Adell et al, Strikes 
in Essential Services, 3.
11. Morley Gunderson and Frank Reid, “Public Sector Strikes in Canada,” in Gene Swimmer 
and Mark Thompson, eds., Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Canada: Beginning of the End 
or End of the Beginning? (Kingston 1995), 135–163, 147.
12. Ponak and Thompson, “Public Sector Collective Bargaining,” 426; Adell et al, Strikes in 
Essential Services, 3.
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Stages of Public Sector Labour Relations Development
Rose identifies four distinct eras in the development of formalized 
public sector labour relations in Canada.13 Before the formalized public sector 
bargaining of the 1960s, many groups of public workers had a long history of 
informal consultation, sometimes characterized as “collective begging.”14 The 
“expansionary” era occurred between the 1960s and the early 1980s. During 
this period public sector employment and unionization expanded quickly, as 
public workers gained access to formal collective bargaining. This period is 
associated with high levels of work stoppages and wage settlements, as public 
employees sought to achieve parity with private sector compensation. In a 
backlash against what governments regarded as the excesses of the preceding 
era, and fueled by recession, the era of “restraint” spanned the 1982 to 1990 
period. Public sector unionization reached saturation levels, and government 
legislation limited public sector collective bargaining, access to strikes, and 
imposed wage restraints. Declines in work stoppages were not reversed until 
the late 1990s.15  
Rose refers to the 1990 to 1997 period as an era of “retrenchment.” The deep 
recession of the early 1990s prompted governments to cut spending through 
significant public sector restructuring, which led to substantial downsizing, 
reduced public employment, and greater reliance on privatization and con-
tracting out.16 This was accompanied by more restrictive restraint legislation 
and broader, and more permanent, limits on public sector bargaining than in 
the previous era. These changes substantially weakened public sector unions, 
leading to public sector wages lagging behind those in the private sector and a 
continued decline in strike activity.
A period of “consolidation” began in about 1998, during which governments 
sought to secure the gains they had made in controlling public sector labour 
relations, even though the economic urgency had abated.  Consequently gov-
ernments continued with hard bargaining and use of legislative intervention 
to limit public sector gains. In spite of the continued restrictive approach to 
public sector collective bargaining and access to strikes, strike activity rose 
during this period. Though the consolidation period is generally regarded as 
continuing to the present, that era is characterized by continued vigorous 
13. Joseph B. Rose, “Public Sector Bargaining: From Retrenchment to Consolidation,” Relations 
industrielles/Industrial Relations, 59 (Spring 2004), 271–94; Joseph B. Rose, “Regulating and 
Resolving Public Sector Disputes in Canada,” Journal of Industrial Relations, 50 (September 
2008), 545–559. 
14. Morley Gunderson, “Collective Bargaining and Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector,” 
in Oxford Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, ed. C. Dunn (Oxford 2002), 517–532, 
518–519. 
15. Thompson and Jalette, “Public Sector Collective Bargaining,” 427; Rose, “Regulating and 
Resolving Public Sector Disputes in Canada,” 547–9. 
16. Ponak and Thompson, “Public Sector Collective Bargaining,” 548.
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government use of legislative restrictions, including reducing the scope of 
negotiable matters, imposing collective agreement terms or interest arbi-
tration. As noted above, these legislative tools are not as readily available 
following the 2007 Health Services decision. It remains to be seen how much 
this substantial Charter limit on government actions will affect public sector 
labour relations. Indications from the first wave of cases applying this decision 
suggest that its effects will be substantial.17 This likely marks the beginning of 
a new era of public sector labour relations, an era of realignment as govern-
ment is forced to rethink how to renegotiate its multiple responsibilities in a 
more restrictive constitutional environment.
Stages of Development in BC Teacher Labour Relations
In contrast with the developmental eras Rose identifies, this article 
regards BC teachers as having followed a distinct labour relations path since 
the mid-20th century, comprised of different eras covering different time 
periods. An era of exclusion stretched from bctf’s inception to 1982. Next a 
period of resistance and revitalization followed from 1982 to 1986, and then an 
era of rapid expansion of labour rights from 1987 to 1993. A period of reform 
in 1994 was followed by a period of reprieve, lasting until 2001. Teachers expe-
rienced serious restraint of their labour relations rights later than other public 
sector workers, joining the era of consolidation in 2002 which continued until 
the post-Health Services era of realignment began in late 2007. The following 
sections provide a fuller explanation of each era and bctf’s labour relations 
strategies.
Era of Exclusion
For most public sector workers informal consultation began to be replaced 
with formal, statutory, collective bargaining following the 1967 Public Sector 
Staff Relations Act, and by the mid-1970s most public employees were eligible 
to bargain collectively. British Columbia’s teachers experienced an extended 
period of being almost wholly excluded from formal labour relations. The 
bctf has been the primary vehicle for teacher negotiations since its establish-
ment in 1911.18 In this earliest period, the Public Schools Act (psa) governed 
17. See e.g. Brian Etherington, “The B.C. Health Services and Support Decision – The 
Constitutionalization of A Right to Bargain Collectively in Canada: Where Did it Come From 
and Where Will it Lead?,” Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 30 (Summer 2009), 
715–749; John P. McEvoy, “B.C. Health Services: The Legacy After 18 Months,” University of 
New Brunswick Law Journal, 59 (Annual 2009), 48–66.
18. Pursuant to An Act to incorporate Benevolent and other Societies, R.S.B.C. 1911, c. 19. For a 
detailed history of this period see Francis H. Johnson, A History of Public Education in British 
Columbia (Vancouver 1964) and Albert A. Blum, ed., Teachers Unions and Associations: A 
Comparative Study (Urbana and Chicago 1969).
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teacher employment and permitted limited collective bargaining by teachers; 
other collective bargaining legislation had no application to teachers.19 The 
legislation permitted school boards and local teachers’ associations to negoti-
ate only salary and bonuses, though they were not obliged to do so. Under this 
system, many school districts used a “two-tier” approach to salary determina-
tion. Minimum salaries were set through collective bargaining, but a teacher 
could seek a higher salary in his or her individual employment contract with 
the district.20
The psa was amended several times over the next decades to impose ever 
stricter limits on the bargaining process. Voluntary interest arbitration was 
introduced in 1919, arbitration at the request of one party in 1937, and finally 
a strict annual bargaining schedule combined with compulsory conciliation 
and binding arbitration of salary and bonuses was implemented in 1958.21 This 
legal framework for teacher collective bargaining persisted, with little modifi-
cation, until the late 1980s.
Dave Barrett’s New Democratic Party (ndp) ousted W.A.C. Bennett’s long-
ruling Socred government in the 1972 election. The Barrett government held 
power for only three years, to December 1975, before a new Socred government 
under Premier Bill Bennett, W.A.C. Bennett’s son, came to power. During the 
ndp’s brief reign, it passed the Labour Code and the Public Service Labour 
Relations Act in 1973, marking a new era for public sector labour relations in 
the province, significantly broadening access to the general labour legislation 
and collective representation for public employees, and generating a wave of 
public sector unionization.22 However, teachers remained excluded, and had 
to wait another decade-and-a-half before gaining access to mainstream labour 
relations legislation.
In this very limiting environment, bctf and its locals embarked on coordi-
nated efforts to shape negotiations and exercise full labour rights, even in the 
absence of supportive legislation. In the 1950s teachers achieved a common 
salary grid recognizing experience and certification.23 bctf then sought to 
19. The Public Schools Act, R.S.B.C. 1911, c.206.
20. Mark Thompson and James F. Cairnie, “Compulsory Arbitration: The Case of British 
Columbia Teachers,” Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 27 (October 1973), 3–17, 5.
21. An Act to amend the “Public Schools Act”, S.B.C. 1919, c. 75, s. 6; Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act, S.B.C. 1937, c. 31, ss. 1, 4, 5, 17; Public Schools Act Amendment Act, 1937, 
R.S.B.C. 1937, c. 68, s.3; Public Schools Act, S.B.C. 1958, c.42, ss.137–143; British Columbia, 
British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association, Teacher-Public School Employer 
Collective Bargaining in BC: Historical Perspectives, 2006, 5 <http://www.bcpsea.bc.ca/docu-
ments/Publications-ResourceDiscussionDocs/historicalperspective2010.pdf> (1 February 
2011).
22. Labour Code, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122; Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 144. 
23. bctf, The Steps Leading to Full Bargaining Rights, n.d. <http://bctf.ca/AboutUs.
aspx?id=18892&printPage=true> (1 February 2011).
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negotiate terms and conditions with school districts beyond the statutory 
limits, especially class size reductions.24 However, between 1968 and 1975 
bctf succeeded in negotiating these “working and learning condition” con-
tracts (wlcs) in only six of the hundreds of school districts then existing 
across the province, and most of these were in the relatively populous and 
urban Lower Mainland.25 Although these wlcs were not legally enforceable, 
no school board challenged their legitimacy.26 
Even though teachers had no clear legal right to strike, and compulsory 
arbitration was prescribed in cases of bargaining impasse, teachers and their 
locals used mass resignations, strikes, participated in work-to-rule campaigns, 
and issued “in-dispute” declarations throughout this period as negotiation 
pressure tactics.27 This unfettered ability to strike – whether technically legal 
or not – was explicitly restricted in 1978 following a two-and-a-half month 
strike in the Kootenays, when the Socred government amended the Essential 
Service Disputes Act (esda) to regulate work stoppages in education.28 
bctf also sought mandatory membership for teachers in the central bctf. 
Larry Kuehn notes that in the late 1930s and 1940s, many in bctf opposed 
compulsory membership until at least 90 per cent of teachers had joined 
voluntarily.29 By 1947, when the government acceded to bctf’s request for 
mandatory membership for teachers, 93 per cent of teachers in the province 
had voluntarily signed up with the organization. Kuehn credits this strong 
organizing tradition with bctf’s later strength.30 
As other commentators observe, beginning in the late 1960s the relation-
ship between bctf and the Socred provincial government became highly 
politicized and confrontational as a result of bctf’s rapidly emerging mili-
tancy and partisan politics.31 bctf’s well-organized and vigorous campaign 
24. Larry Kuehn, interview by author; bctf, The Steps. 
25. bctf, History of Teacher Collective Bargaining 1917–2002, 26 September 2003, <http://
www.labour.gov.bc.ca/pubs/teacher/appb_bctf.pdf> (1 February 2011), 2. 
26. Kuehn, interview.
27. bctf, History of Teacher Collective Bargaining, 4. 
28. Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, special data request; West Kootenay 
Schools Collective Bargaining Assistance Act, S.B.C. 1978, c. 42, s. 11 amended the Essential 
Service Disputes Act, S.B.C. 1977, c. 83, s. 8(b) to regulate “a substantial disruption in the deliv-
ery of educational services in the province.” 
29. Kuehn, interview.
30. Public Schools Act Amendment Act, 1947, R.S.B.C. 1947, c. C-79, s.101; Kuehn, interview; 
bctf, History of bctf, n.d., <http://bctf.ca/uploadedFiles/About_Us/HistorySummary.pdf> (1 
February 2011), 3.
31. See Thomas Fleming, “From Educational Government to the Government of Education: 
The Decline and Fall of the British Columbia Ministry of Education, 1972–1996,” Historical 
Studies in Education, 15 (Fall 2003), 210–36, 271; Marlene Ingrid Yri, “The British Columbia 
Teachers’ Federation and its Conversion to Partisanship, 1966–1972,” MA thesis, University of 
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against the Socred government and its policies played a significant role in 
the 1972 change in government. These political efforts included a Teacher 
Political Action Committee, and bctf’s 1969 “apple” campaign contesting 
government’s education funding policies, supporting candidates whose posi-
tions matched those of the Teachers’ Federation. In 1977 a group of radical 
teachers formed the “Teachers’ Viewpoint,”  a progressive caucus within bctf. 
Several executive members, and three presidents, including Larry Kuehn, were 
Viewpoint members.32 Objection to the government’s education policy and 
reforms to teacher pensions culminated in a province-wide, political, teachers’ 
strike on 19 March 1971.  Shortly thereafter, in what was seen as retribution 
for this public opposition, the Socred government removed bctf member-
ship as a condition of employment for teachers.33 Reflecting the rancour of 
the government-bctf relationship, Patrick McGeer, then Liberal Party leader, 
asked the Legislature: “Is it possible, Mr. Speaker, at some future time, that a 
condition for not being hired by a school board will be membership in the B.C. 
Teachers’ Federation?”34
Though the succeeding ndp government restored compulsory bctf 
membership, in the meantime the Teachers’ Federation mounted a success-
ful membership drive, getting all but 69 of the province’s 22,000 teachers to 
join or retain their membership.35 Notably, Anthony Brummett, later Socred 
Minister of Education under Premier Vander Zalm, was among the few teach-
ers who did not join bctf at this time.36 This was the first of several times a 
provincial government would attack bctf by trying to weaken its member-
ship. Each time bctf would achieve near-total support from teachers.
In sum, although teachers did not participate in the expansion of rights 
enjoyed by much of the public sector in the pre-1980 period, bctf did success-
fully assume broader access to bargaining and striking before any statutory 
grant of rights. It also reoriented itself as an aggressively political organiza-
tion, showing tremendous capacity to organize and coordinate locals, and to 
initiate and set the course for labour relations change.
British Columbia, 1979.
32. Fleming, “From Educational Government to the Government of Education,” 271.
33. An Act to Amend the Public Schools Act, R.S.B.C. 1971, c. C-47; Legislative Assembly of BC, 
Proceedings of the 29th Parliament, 2nd Session, 15 March 1971, 688; Kuehn, interview. 
34. Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Proceedings of the 29th Parliament, 2nd Session, 
15 March 1971, 688.
35. An Act to Amend the Public Schools Act, R.S.B.C. 1973, c. C-142, s. 144; bctf, History of 
bctf.
36. Kuehn, interview. 
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Era of Resistance and Revitalization: 1982 to 1986
By the early 1980s teachers remained excluded from mainstream labour 
relations, and also participated little in the conventional labour relations com-
munity. This was about to change. The 1980s brought significant public sector 
labour reforms prompted, in part, by widespread labour unrest following rapid 
expansion of public sector unionization in the 1970s. BC also suffered a pro-
tracted and serious economic recession in the 1980s. The relationship between 
public sector unions and Premier Bill Bennett’s Socred government became 
increasingly volatile and antagonistic. Premier Bennett was seen to hold a 
deep disdain for education and teachers, and one commentator characterized 
Premier Bennett’s treatment of teachers during this time as a “‘double punish-
ment’ ploy”, reflecting both his contempt for formal education and his anger at 
the growing “radicalism and left-wing orientation at the executive level of the 
BC Teachers Federation.” 37
After finding that it could not secure wlcs in more than a handful of school 
districts, in the early 1980s bctf set the explicit target of achieving full, 
formal, bargaining rights.38 Kuehn explains that: 
[T]he key to our strategy was to restructure ourselves in a way which assumed that we had 
the right to bargain the whole range of things and then to try to take that into the bargain-
ing arena … the strategic view was that if we did that for a period of time and we have 
restructured the reality then the law would follow.39
bctf restructured its committees, developed strategies for influencing 
school board budgets, established a unilateral wlc grievance procedure, and 
adjusted the demands it tabled. As Kuehn recalls, then in his first year as bctf 
President, in the 1981 bargaining round “we didn’t put money on the table at 
all … we only talked about working and learning conditions and … at no time 
did I ever talk about salaries.”40
This strategy had limited success in widening the scope of bargaining. 
Kuehn describes the progress made as “Very little. In a patchwork of things in 
contracts.”41 However, teachers did win substantial salary increases.  Kuehn 
recalls: “the [school] boards just kept putting more money on the table. They 
would say ‘no we can’t talk about this’ ” when the association raised non-salary 
37. Alan Twigg, Vander Zalm: From Immigrant to Premier (Madeira Park 1986), 94.
38. Kuehn, interview; bctf, The Steps. 
39. Kuehn, interview.
40. Kuehn, interview.
41. Kuehn, interview.  The frequency of wlcs on specified issues among the 75 locals, between 
1980–85 was: 27 on elementary preparation time; 30 on noon hour supervision; 12 on transfers; 
19 on personnel practices; 36 on leaves; 42 on professional development; 11 on educational 
leave; and, 27 on grievance procedure (bctf, History of Teacher Collective Bargaining). 
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matters in bargaining, and would make a higher salary offer.42 This established 
a wage settlement pattern that was then adopted in arbitration decisions for 
other districts.43 bctf suggests that these rich salary agreements weakened 
teacher support for formal strike access, leading to teachers voting 60-40 
against a February 1982 proposal to call for legislation allowing teacher locals 
the option of striking rather than going to arbitration to resolve bargaining 
disputes.44 
Until the early 1980s bctf had relied on a telephone network for com-
munications, with volunteer regional coordinators maintaining ongoing 
communication between local negotiators and the central bctf. Thinking 
ahead to hoped-for fuller bargaining, Kuehn said “we knew … that it would 
be more complex once we got into dealing with things other than salaries and 
benefits that we had to have a system that would allow us to provide more 
information.”45 bctf invested heavily in a computer network, and in 1981 bctf 
was the first union in the world to establish an online labour network.46 Kuehn 
says that a computer network struck him as a valuable investment because “the 
core of our strategies was communications.”47 After two years of successful use 
by the Executive Committee, in 1983 bctf expanded the network, providing 
every local with a terminal and training on the network. Kuehn credits this 
with enabling the bctf to not only survive the Socred attacks but to thrive 
during the 1980s.48 This network would later give bctf a significant advantage 
over school boards in organizing, negotiating and striking, when it achieved 
expanded formal bargaining rights later in the decade.
In 1982 the Bennett government began implementing its anti-worker agenda 
in earnest. The first wave of measures included the 1982 Interim Education 
Finance Act and Compensation Stabilization Act, introducing ceilings on 
school board expenditures and wage controls.49 Although school boards 
had local taxation authority at this time, these changes transferred financial 
control to the provincial government, depriving school boards of real bar-
gaining power.50 This prompted bctf to join other workers and students to 
42. Kuehn, interview.  
43. Kuehn, interview.  
44. bctf, The Steps; Kuehn, interview.
45. Kuehn, interview.
46. Eric Lee, The Labour Movement and the Internet: The New Internationalism (Chicago 1997), 
88, provides a detailed history of bctf’s technological development; Kuehn, interview.
47. Kuehn, interview.
48. Lee, The Labour Movement and the Internet, 46, 49, 51, 53.
49. Education (Interim) Finance Act, S.B.C. 1982, c. 2; Compensation Stabilization Act, S.B.C. 
1982, c. 32. Introduced as a two-year program, it remained in effect until late 1987.
50. bctf, History of Teacher Collective Bargaining, 5. 
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establish the political pressure group: “Defend Education Services Coalition.”51 
Incongruously, in the midst of this, Bill Vander Zalm, then Minister of 
Education, initiated informal discussions with bctf about extending formal 
bargaining rights to teachers. bctf could not accept the proposal, which the 
Premier also rejected, because it excluded administrators. Kuehn claims that 
bctf couldn’t agree to anything that didn’t include all of its members.52
The following year the government introduced a “restraint program” of 26 
bills introduced on 7 July 1983. Much of this legislation targeted the public 
sector and public sector labour relations, removing seniority rights and the 
ability to negotiate working conditions, and centralizing administrative and 
fiscal power from local and elected government bodies such as school boards 
to the cabinet and its agencies. Several of these bills directly affected teach-
ers but the majority were directed at the BC Government Employees’ Union 
(bcgeu) and its members.53 The government engaged in no consultation before 
introducing this legislation and invoked closure 21 times during debate on the 
Bills – the first time closure had been used in the province.54 
Opposition to the government’s program was organized almost immedi-
ately by the Vancouver and District Labour Council, which quickly established 
a coalition of unions and community groups.55 An 11 July 1983 meeting of 
these organizations and groups produced a series of resolutions and called 
on the British Columbia Federation of Labour (bcfl), headed by Art Kube, to 
lead a provincial protest on 23 July.56 Despite the reported lack of enthusiasm 
of the bcfl’s leadership and Kube for these opposition actions, bcfl agreed to 
organize and lead the opposition.57 It announced formation of the “Operation 
Solidarity” coalition in early August 1983, and a province-wide movement 
protesting the budget and government actions, the “Solidarity Coalition,” 
was formed in mid-August.58 Larry Kuehn became centrally involved in both 
51. bctf, The Steps. 
52. Kuehn, interview.
53. Bills affecting teachers included: Bill 3, Public Sector Restraint Act, S.B.C. 1983, c. 26 
(granting wide latitude for terminating public employees upon collective agreement ter-
mination); Bill 6, Education (Interim) Finance Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1983, c. 14 (affected 
school board taxing authority and centralizing budget authority); and, Bill 11, Compensation 
Stabilization Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1983, c.13 (wage control legislation).
54. Mark Thompson, “Restraint and Labour Relations: The Case of British Columbia,” 
Canadian Public Policy, 11 (June 1985), 171–179, 172, 174; Bob Plecas, Bill Bennett: A 
Mandarin’s View (Vancouver 2006), 214, 218.
55. Bryan D. Palmer, Solidarity: The Rise & Fall of an Opposition in British Columbia 
(Vancouver 1987), 27.
56. Palmer, Solidarity, 27.
57. Palmer, Solidarity, 28.
58. Palmer, Solidarity, 34–5.  These movements are well documented in Palmer, Solidarity; 
Peter Poole, “Organized Labour vs. the State in British Columbia: The Political Limitations of 
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branches of this movement. Solidarity initiatives included mass demonstra-
tions, occupying Cabinet offices, and several public sector strikes, including 
two weeks of escalating work stoppages. These stoppages began with a 1 
November 1983 legal walkout by 35,000 provincial government workers whose 
collective agreement had expired. This was followed by strikes by other public 
sector groups, scheduled to take place in sequence, including a three-day 
teacher strike commencing on 8 November.59 
The teachers’ threatened walk-out became a crucial event in the Solidarity 
dispute, with other unions and government skeptical that teachers would 
actually go out.60 Only 60 per cent of teacher votes cast supported strik-
ing.61 Unions knew that a failed teachers’ strike would be a tremendous blow 
to Solidarity. The government was counting on this, and added pressure by 
threatening teachers with loss of their teaching certificates if they struck.62
On 7 November, with the teachers poised to walk out, Solidarity and the 
government nearly struck a deal to end the escalating job action. One element 
of the deal was approval of an agreement reached between teachers and the 
school board in North Vancouver.63 Collective agreement negotiations had 
been underway in the district and the parties had agreed on a seniority lay-off 
provision. Kuehn claims that “at the last minute … the Minister said no, that 
[provision] wouldn’t be acceptable.”64 This rejection, coupled with govern-
ment’s refusal to exempt bcgeu from the certain restraint legislation, caused 
the potential deal to collapse.65
To the surprise of many, on 8 November 1983, over 85 per cent of teachers 
participated in the illegal walk-out.66 Kuehn credits bctf’s computer network 
as important to the success of this strike, saying that it helped build a sense of 
camaraderie in the lead up to the strike and in the strike itself.67 The teachers’ 
action was over quickly, with most teachers returning to work the following 
day in the face of injunctions restraining picketing, cease and desist orders, 
and illegal strike declarations. School districts successfully characterized 
Trade Unions,” MA thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1987; and, Plecas, Bill Bennett.
59. Thompson, “Restraint and Labour Relations,” 172; bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 5; 
William K. Carroll and R.S. Ratner, “Social Democracy, Neo-Conservatism, and Hegemonic 
Crisis in British Columbia,” Critical Sociology, 16 (Spring 1989), 29–53, 39–40.
60. Palmer, Solidarity, 65–66.
61. bctf, The Steps. 
62. Palmer, Solidarity, 65–66.
63. Palmer, Solidarity, 66. 
64. Kuehn, interview.
65. Palmer, Solidarity, 66.
66. Palmer, Solidarity, 66.
67. Kuehn, interview.
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teachers’ actions as an illegal sympathy strike, rather than a political strike 
which would have been outside the lrb’s jurisdiction to restrain, by induc-
ing teachers on picket lines to make statements suggesting that their action 
supported bcgeu’s legal strike.68 As brief as the teachers’ action was, it was 
powerful. As one commentator notes, the teachers had “forced the Social 
Credit government to negotiate its legislation.”69 
Nevertheless, by this point the Solidarity leadership was anxious to settle, 
as both it and the government recognized that Operation Solidarity would not 
succeed.70 Although the bcfl and unions took over a lead role in Solidarity 
actions, some involved at the time contend that it did so in order to control 
and limit the action.71 Jack Munro, regional vice–president of the iwa, one 
of the largest private-sector unions, and ultimately the key figure in bring-
ing an end to Solidarity later wrote that, while Solidarity had substantial 
grassroots support, “Privately, the overwhelming opinion of the majority of 
the labour leadership … was that we could not sustain this, that we had to 
stop it.”72  Seeking to end the Solidarity action in early November, prior to the 
teachers’ walk-out and without Solidarity’s knowledge, Munro contacted Jim 
Matkin, head of the BC Employers’ Council and former deputy minister of 
labour to discuss a settlement.73  Shortly thereafter, Munro recalls “we moved 
in to derail this thing. It was getting pretty damn close to the time when the 
private sector unions were supposed to go out. And my members weren’t going 
anywhere.”74
Solidarity concluded on 14 November 1983 with a verbal agreement between 
Premier Bennett and Munro, representing Operation Solidarity, in the infa-
mous “Kelowna Accord.” The Accord provided that Bill 2, limiting the scope 
of matters bcgeu could bargain, would be eliminated; public sector unions 
could negotiate exemptions from Bill 3; there would be no striker reprisals; 
the millions in savings resulting from the teachers’ strike would be retained 
for education; education funding would remain near 1983 levels; and advi-
sory committees would be struck regarding human rights, tenancy and labour 
legislation.75 
68. Palmer, Solidarity, 68. 
69. Palmer, Solidarity, 79.
70. Plecas, Bill Bennett, 228; Palmer, Solidarity, 69.
71. Palmer, Solidarity, 28–9.
72. Jack Munro and Jane O’Hara, Union Jack: Labour Leader Jack Munro (Vancouver and 
Toronto 1988).
73. Munro & O’Hara, Union Jack, 8.
74. Munro & O’Hara, Union Jack, 9.
75. Palmer, Solidarity, 79.
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Teachers’ central role in Solidarity inspired the government to punish teach-
ers after the dispute. As Palmer describes it, Bennett led “a personal crusade” 
against Kuehn, and reneged on the Accord’s funding commitments to teach-
ers. Moreover, Minister of Education Jack Heinrich maintained that Munro 
had agreed that teachers would make up the strike days.76 
While Solidarity is widely regarded as a failure, the Kelowna Accord a 
capitulation if not a betrayal of the province’s workers by labour leaders, and 
teachers are seen as having suffered among the worst fallout of the Accord, 
Kuehn offers an optimistic view of the longer-term effects of the Solidarity 
experience for teachers.  He maintains that the Solidarity strike was the real 
turning point in teachers’ efforts to expand bargaining rights, crediting it with 
triggering a “psychological change in teachers” crucial to achieving broader 
bargaining and access to strikes in the coming years.77 As evidence of this 
change, Kuehn points out that bctf’s 1982 referendum on pursing strike rights 
had been defeated by a 60 to 40 vote. Just the next year, teachers voted 60 to 40 
in favour of going out on strike for Solidarity, and over 85 per cent of teachers 
struck. As Kuehn describes it: “essentially we had a shift in that middle group 
there from one side to the other in terms of action” and “Solidarity showed 
that – for those who feared that striking would be the end of the world – it 
clearly wasn’t.”78
It is also the case that after Solidarity bctf did achieve a breakthrough 
in expanding the scope of negotiable matters under wlc contracts. bctf 
considered getting seniority layoff provisions in negotiated contracts to be 
essential. It had prioritized securing that provision in at least one school dis-
trict during that year’s round of bargaining. The first district to agree had been 
North Vancouver in November 1983. Although the Minister had rejected this 
provision just before the teachers’ Solidarity strike, the parties later renewed 
agreement on that provision and the Ministry accepted it. This opened the 
door to bctf securing job obtaining provisions in locals throughout the prov-
ince. These provisions were valuable during the post-Solidarity layoff of 600 
teachers, first applied in Abbotsford School District, where the local bctf 
president was among the first teachers slated for termination.79   
Era of Expansion: 1987 to 1993
For most of the public sector, the restraint era continued through the 
1980s to 1990, and the even more restrictive period of retrenchment lasted 
from 1990 to 1997. For teachers, however, the 1987 to 1993 period was their era 
76. Palmer, Solidarity, 79.
77. Kuehn, interview. 
78. Kuehn, interview.
79. Kuehn, interview.
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of expansion, during which they realized fuller labour relations rights than at 
any time before or since: broad scope, local bargaining, and access to strikes, 
though subject to essential service limits. To this day, bctf remains deter-
mined to return to this golden era of teacher negotiations.
In October 1986, new Socred leader Bill Vander Zalm became Premier. A 
charismatic, grassroots politician, well known for his strong religious and 
socially conservative views, Vander Zalm had a fractious relationship with the 
bctf dating back to his brief time as Minister of Education in 1982. Anthony 
Brummett, a former teacher and one of the few who had refused to join bctf 
during its 1972 membership drive, was Minister of Education during the 
critical period from August 1986 to December 1990. bctf had not forgotten 
Brummett’s earlier rejection and it coloured their relationship. Kuehn recalls: 
“Brummett had a sense of regret, I think, that we would never talk to him. He 
felt he had so much to do and offer and we always ignored him.”80
Though bctf won greater informal scope for negotiations from the gov-
ernment, it continued to seek full access to collective bargaining and striking 
under the Labour Code, which excluded teachers at that time. bctf suc-
cessfully, though to no effect, contested this exclusion as violating Canada’s 
commitments to freedom of association, in a complaint to the International 
Labour Organization (ilo).81
Ironically, it took a legal miscalculation in another case to ultimately propel 
teachers into mainstream labour legislation. bctf had filed a Charter chal-
lenge contending that teachers’ statutory exclusion from the Labour Code 
unjustifiably violated their rights of free association, liberty and security of 
the person, and equality.82 Legal advice that the Charter challenge would likely 
succeed prompted the government to pre-empt a court decision by amending 
the legislation to grant teachers access to mainstream collective bargaining 
rights, including striking. By acting before being forced to by the courts, the 
government calculated that it could ensure that “certain safeguards” were in 
place.83  In mid-1987 it passed the Industrial Relations Reform Act (Bill 19) 
and the Teaching Profession Act (Bill 20), rendering the Charter challenge 
moot.84 Soon after, and surely to the government’s dismay, the Supreme Court 
of Canada issued a trilogy of decisions in which the majority rejected any 
80. Kuehn, interview.
81. ilo Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 243: Canada (Geneva 1986), Dec. 
1350.
82. See bctf v. BC, [1985] B.C.J. No. 3011.   
83. Bill Vander Zalm, For the People: Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: the Autobiography of British 
Columbia’s 28th Premier (Vancouver 2008), 271.
84. Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987, S.B.C. 1987, c. 24; Teaching Profession Act, S.B.C. 
1987, c. 19.
LLT-68.indb   50 11-11-07   4:18 PM
british columbia teachers’ quest for collective bargaining rights   51
Charter protection for access to collective bargaining or striking.85 In fairness 
to the government and its lawyers, these decisions were widely considered to 
have been unexpected results. This remained the state of the law for 30 years, 
until the 2007 Health Services decision.86 
Bills 19 and 20 incorporated teachers into the general labour relations 
statute, marking the start of the modern era of education labour relations 
in BC. Bill 19 was a broad piece of legislation, replacing the Labour Code 
and Labour Relations Board with the Industrial Relations Act (ira) and the 
Industrial Relations Council (irc). While it expanded teachers’ access to col-
lective bargaining, it also introduced many anti-labour features to the general 
labour relations system.87 Therefore, teachers were the only segment of labour 
in the province to benefit from Bill 19. Bill 20 exclusively addressed teacher 
regulation. 
Together, Bills 19 and 20 brought teacher collective bargaining within 
mainstream labour regulation under the general labour legislation: the new 
ira. The mandatory annual negotiation schedule and mandatory concilia-
tion and compulsory arbitration deadlines were removed. Teachers now had 
broad scope collective bargaining, covering both salary and working condi-
tions except for teacher appointments, appointments of education support 
workers, and assigning teaching duties to administrators. However, principals 
and vice-principals were excluded from teacher bargaining and bctf mem-
bership.88 Strikes and lockouts, which continued to be at the local level, were 
now regulated by the ira, and subject to the ira’s essential services clause. 
This authorized the new irc to designate educational services an “essential 
service” and limit work stoppage activity if the dispute posed a “threat to the 
economy of the province or to the health, safety or welfare of its residents or to 
the provision of educational services in the province.”89 
From teachers’ perspectives, the most controversial aspects of these Bills 
were Bill 20’s creation of the British Columbia College of Teachers (bcct) 
to act as the qualification, certifying and professional body for teachers, and 
removal of compulsory bctf membership. The latter effectively required bctf 
to certify each local association under the ira union certification process in 
order to continue representing teachers in the school district. This meant that 
teachers in each school district had to decide whether or not to be represented 
85. Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.); psac v. 
Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (Can.); rwdsu v. Saskatchewan [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
86. Health Services & Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v. British Columbia, 2007 
scc 27 (“Health Services”).
87. Industrial Relations Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 24.
88. Bill 20, ss. 1(1), 44(a), 69, 70–71, 78; School Act, ss. 104, 131.2, 133–137, 141.
89. Bill 19 repealed the esda, incorporating its essential service provisions into ira s.137.8.  
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by bctf.90 If teachers chose the bctf certification option, that would bring 
ira coverage and the attendant access to broad scope bargaining and strikes 
subject to essential service designations. If teachers in a local did not certify, 
choosing the professional association option, they would have no ability to 
strike, and binding arbitration would be the dispute resolution mechanism for 
a limited array of bargainable matters.91
Fleming describes the government’s agenda, reporting that by creating bcct 
Cabinet hoped that it would become the public voice of teachers, and that this 
voice would be more professional and less militant; that bcct might divide 
the more radical from the moderate teachers, weakening the more militant 
influences and lessen bctf’s power. Moreover, removing principals and vice-
principals would “shore up management’s control of the schools.”92
Bills 19 and 20 significantly affected labour relations in the province. Most 
broadly, they renewed the general and teacher-specific antagonism between 
labour and government, creating long-lasting labour unrest in the province. 
While the Bills reinvigorated bctf, they also ignited enduring bctf resistance 
to the bcct, and established a poorly thought-out teacher bargaining system 
that led to  contentious, conflict-ridden negotiations, many and lengthy work 
stoppages, and claims of unfair pressure on local school boards to agree to 
unaffordable provisions.
The Bills sparked a general strike of some 300,000 workers on 1 June 1987. 
The bcfl also initiated a broader “Program of Action,” which urged unions 
to withdraw from all tripartite initiatives and to boycott the irc. It also orga-
nized Bill 19 protests. bctf’s immediate response to the introduction of Bill 
20 was to conduct a province-wide vote of teachers, then to initiate a political 
strike, closing schools by holding study sessions and rallies in several cities on 
28 April 1987.93 bctf also planned an instruction-only campaign to follow a 
one-day Bill 20 walkout.94 
bctf regarded the creation of bcct as an effort to weaken teacher union-
ism by removing its professional regulation role, leaving it with a collective 
bargaining role that it could only continue to exercise if it was able to certify 
in each school district.  bctf viewed this as a “direct attack” on teachers, 
meant to split teachers’ loyalty and undermine bctf.95 Some commentators 
90. Ken Halliday, interview by author.
91. Ken Novakowski, “Gaining Full Bargaining Rights,” Teacher Newsmagazine, 12:6 (5 April 
2000), <http://www.bctf.ca/publications/NewsmagArticle.aspx?id=12818> (1 February 2011), 5; 
bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 12; Bill 20, ss. 67–69, 73.
92. Fleming, “From Educational Government to the Government of Education,” 231–2.
93. bctf, The Steps; Novakowski, “Gaining Full Bargaining Rights,” 5. 
94. Carroll and Ratner, “Hegemonic Crisis,” 44. 
95. Novakowski, “Gaining Full Bargaining Rights,” 5; bctf, The Steps; Charles S. Ungerleider, 
“Globalization, Professionalization, and Educational Politics in British Columbia,” Canadian 
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describe it as retribution for the bctf’s militant opposition to the government 
in 1983.96 This ignited decades of conflict between the union and the college, 
culminating in a 2010 fact-finder’s report offering a scathing assessment of 
bctf’s influence on bcct’s activities.97
However, once again bctf quickly mobilized, signing up 98 per cent of 
the province’s public school teachers, and certifying its locals in each of the 
province’s 75 school districts.98 Kuehn believes that this experience ultimately 
strengthened bctf:  
[T]o some degree it was the choice mechanism that actually strengthened us. You know, 
taking away your membership and having to make a choice, made us go out and talk to 
every single person about what the implications were – each of the options there.99 
In the view of several employer negotiators, the government had been so 
convinced that teachers would abandon the bctf that it had not given suf-
ficient thought to how local collective bargaining would operate among 75 
separate bargaining units, with highly coordinated bctf locals bargaining 
against uncoordinated, and often highly teacher-sympathetic school trustees, 
if bctf did certify.100 
Why the government was so certain that teachers would reject bctf is 
bewildering. Labour relations experts were convinced at the time that there 
was no chance that a significant proportion of teachers would reject their 
union.101 Ken Halliday recalls discussing the predicted bctf rout with Bud 
Gallagher, then lrb Chair, after some Ministry representatives had visited 
Gallagher: 
[Gallagher said] they were all convinced there was going to be a number of the districts that 
would kick out the bctf and either have another union or no union. And he said he couldn’t 
believe it, but some of these guys had double digit numbers. I said like one, maybe. We both 
laughed because there was no chance in hell.102
The explanation for this miscalculation likely lies in the backroom manner in 
which the legislation was formulated, the Premier’s general tendency to reject 
contrary views, and the limited input he therefore received on the legislation 
Journal of Educational Administration and Policy, 9 (December 1996), 5 <www.umanitoba.ca/
publications/cjeap/ articles/ungerlieder.html> (10 March 2011). 
96. Carroll & Ratner, “Hegemonic Crisis,” 42.  
97. British Columbia. Ministry of Education, A College Divided: Report of the Fact Finder on 
the BC College of Teachers, October 2010, <http://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/pubs/2010_factfinder_
report_bcct.pdf> (20 December 2010).
98. Ungerleider, “Educational Politics in British Columbia”; bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 12.
99. Kuehn, interview.
100. Halliday, interview; Hugh Finlayson, interview by author.
101. Halliday, interview; Finlayson, interview.
102. Halliday, interview.
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and teachers’ attitudes. These Bills were not the product of broad consultation, 
but were drafted under the Premier’s direction by a small working group of pri-
marily private firm lawyers, in secret, without public consultation, and without 
the Minister of Labour’s knowledge or participation. This was occurring at the 
same time the Premier had tasked the Minister with developing recommenda-
tions for Labour Code reform. The Minister was engaging in public hearings 
and meetings, while the working group met secretly. As Deputy Minister 
of Labour at the time, Graham Leslie says, all of the Minister’s work was “a 
farce.”103 Leslie is highly critical of the working group and later described the 
legislation as “the product of too few and too narrow minds … constructed 
without the benefit of meaningful input from knowledgeable, practical people 
within the employer and trade union communities.”104  Kuehn also suggests 
that Minister Brummett, with his history of disconnection from majority 
teacher views, may have strongly influenced Vander Zalm.105
The local bargaining structure established by Bills 19 and 20 operated 
between 1987 and 1993, with most school boards bargaining three rounds of 
multi-year, broad-scope collective agreements with local teachers’ associa-
tions during this period. The first round of negotiations, in 1988, occurred 
under a Socred government. In fall 1991, in the midst of most districts’ second 
round of negotiations, the ndp came to power under Premier Mike Harcourt, 
winning 51 of the 75 seats in the Legislature, while the Socreds were reduced 
to seven seats. The final round of negotiations, in 1993, took place under an 
ndp government. bctf described local bargaining and its outcomes as “a won-
derful victory for teachers … using their newly acquired rights to overturn 
decades of unilateral actions by boards”106 and declaring that “collective bar-
gaining had truly come of age for teachers. Teachers finally had an appropriate 
vehicle to exercise their collective will within the public system.”107 
Teachers made the most of the expanded scope of bargaining and secured 
several important gains under local bargaining. In the first round, existing 
practices and procedures were widely incorporated into collective agree-
ments, and many locals secured class size limits and significant salary 
increases. In subsequent rounds more locals obtained these provisions, and 
some won limits on class composition.108 In a final blow to the Socred gov-
ernment’s earlier removal of statutorily mandated bctf membership, most 
teachers’ locals negotiated closed-shop provisions, requiring that teachers join 
103. Graham Leslie, Breach of Promise: Socred Ethics under Vander Zalm (Madeira Park 1991), 
38, 49. 
104. Leslie, Breach of Promise, 53.
105. Kuehn, interview.
106. bctf, The Steps.
107. bctf, History of bctf, 5.
108. bctf, The Steps.
LLT-68.indb   54 11-11-07   4:18 PM
british columbia teachers’ quest for collective bargaining rights   55
and maintain bctf membership.109 bctf characterized the salary increases as 
large enough that they “allow[ed] us to not only keep up with inflation, but also 
to recover some of the losses we had experienced as a result of the wage control 
program of the eighties.”110
bctf established a “war room” to coordinate its province-wide bargain-
ing agenda across locals. It created a collective agreement provision database, 
trained negotiators for local teachers’ associations, and required locals to 
submit bargaining proposals for central approval.111 bctf’s computer network 
was again proving its usefulness. bctf also developed a sophisticated form 
of simultaneous whipsawing in negotiations.112 It would target a particular 
school board it viewed as the “softest” on a given bargaining issue, prioritize 
that issue and, as soon as it obtained a favourable agreement on that provi-
sion, would pursue it in other districts.113 Kuehn recalls that “we had what 
I called a rolling pattern bargaining system. After every single bargaining 
session where somebody in some local got something, they put it on to the 
network which then became a bottom line for everybody on those issues.”114 
Because teachers in one local could then argue that they were only bargaining 
for what other locals had already agreed on, this was a powerful bargaining 
strategy that attracted support among teachers for striking, and was also com-
pelling to third parties involved in settling negotiations.115 One employer later 
described the bargaining experience as being like “the local pick-up team (the 
school board) playing the travelling all stars (the bctf). Guess who won every 
game?”116 
These experiences created a strong feeling among school boards that the 
local bargaining structure was tilted in favour of teachers and that as a result 
school boards were being forced into collective agreements that the districts 
did not have the resources to fund, and which went too far in limiting school 
boards’ managerial role.117 This perception of unfairness, and school boards’ 
inability to match bctf’s bargaining prowess, later became an important 
109. Lawton et al., Teachers’ Unions in Canada, 91. A teacher deemed to have resigned after re-
fusing to join bctf challenged this action and related ira provisions as contrary to the Charter, 
but ultimately withdrew the claim (Janzen v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] B.C.J. 
No. 2682).
110. bctf, History.
111. Halliday, interview.
112. Kuehn, interview.
113. Halliday, interview.
114. Kuehn, interview.
115. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 15.
116. British Columbia, Towards a Better Teacher Bargaining Model, 4.
117. BC, The Public Sector in British Columbia, F20; British Columbia, Towards a Better 
Teacher Bargaining Model, 3; bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 15.
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factor in the ndp government’s decision to restructure public sector negotia-
tions to make it more accountable.
However, rather than a product of the local bargaining structure, this 
unequal bargaining power largely reflected the parties’ relative levels of coor-
dination and preparedness. As an education employer’s representative says, 
employers “were simply outmaneuvered by the bctf with its effective orga-
nizational, training, and coordinating abilities.”118 bctf locals were generally 
more prepared and informed than the school boards they were negotiating 
with, which had no coordinated system of information sharing.119 
In addition to lack of coordination and preparation, school boards also 
faced other difficulties as negotiators, primarily arising from the constituen-
cies they were accountable to, and school trustees’ relationships with teachers. 
Several commentators note that instead of having a provincial perspective on 
bargaining, as did bctf, school boards were accountable to and thus oriented 
towards their local communities. Therefore, school boards were not primarily 
concerned with the province-wide precedents they might set.120 This perspec-
tive was often heightened by school boards’ desire for autonomy.121 Moreover, 
trustees had little bargaining experience, and many principals and vice-prin-
cipals who had, until recently, been members of the local associations they 
now bargained against, found it difficult to negotiate.122 This disregard for the 
broader implications of local agreements, in conjunction with school boards’ 
bargaining inexperience and sympathy for teachers, meant that local trustee-
board negotiators fared poorly against bctf’s coordinated, province-wide 
strategy.123
Multiple work stoppages marked each of the three rounds of negotiations. 
Overall more than 50 work stoppages, including “work-to-rule” campaigns, 
full strikes, and lockouts occurred.124 Even though school boards later com-
plained about the serious disruption,125 few school districts made essential 
service applications to the lrb, and none were pursued to the point of the lrb 
making a designation. A school district representative involved in bargaining 
during this period explained that many school boards were probably not even 
118. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 15.
119. Lee, The Labour Movement and the Internet, 52–53; Halliday, interview.
120. British Columbia, Towards a Better Teacher Bargaining Model, 3–4; bcpsea, Historical 
Perspectives, 15.
121. Halliday, interview.
122. Gene Geisert and Carol Chandler, “Learning the ABC’s the Hard Way: Teacher Unionism 
in the 1990’s,” Government Union Review, 12 (Spring 1991), 1–23.
123. Halliday, interview.
124. Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, special data request.
125. British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association, A Report to the Minister from the 
Chair (Vancouver 1993), 9. 
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aware that they could make an essential service application to the lrb to limit 
strike activity.126 
The first two rounds of negotiations resulted in negotiated settlements 
in each school district, although third party assistance, such as mediation, 
was common. The final round of bargaining, in 1993, encountered more dif-
ficulty, and financial resources were the key sticking point. The Ministry of 
Education’s position was that, in the weakened economy, school boards would 
be expected to restrain costs.127 The bctf also faced greater obstacles in press-
ing its demands. By its own account, teachers were less supportive of striking, 
and the public was less sympathetic to teachers’ positions than in earlier 
rounds.128 By late in the 1993 school year, lengthy negotiations in numerous 
districts had yet to produce agreements.
The ndp government responded to a lengthy strike in the Vancouver School 
District with the Educational Programs Continuation Act (Bill 31), introduced 
and passed on Sunday, 30 May 1993. Bill 31 ordered teachers back to work the 
following day and imposed binding arbitration.129 It also provided “notice,” 
as the Minister of Labour characterized it, to other ongoing teacher disputes 
by permitting the government to appoint a special mediator and authority 
to deem the special mediator’s report the collective agreement. Employers 
later reported that Bill 31 did encourage settlements in other districts.130 
In introducing the Bill, ndp Minister of Labour Moe Sihota explained that 
public sector collective bargaining differs from that in the private sector, and 
is a limited right that sometimes must give way to social responsibilities and 
public welfare, and that in this case the continuing strike threatened students’ 
ability to complete the year and graduate and the government was intervening 
to protect the public interest.131 This marked the first time the government – 
and an ndp government at that – directly intervened to end a teachers’ dispute 
in BC.
126. Finlayson, interview.  Work stoppages in education were subject to essential service 
restrictions for all but a short time between 1987 and 1993. In 1993, the ndp government 
replaced the ira and irc with the Labour Relations Code (lrc) and the Labour Relations Board 
(lrb), reversing many of the anti-labour features of the ira. Most relevant to teachers was that 
the explicit reference to education was removed from the essential service restrictions (lrc, 
s.72). However, this unfettered access to work stoppages was short-lived. Later that year the lrb 
ruled that the amended provision still encompassed educational services, though permitting a 
wider scope of strike activity (School District No. 54 (Bulkley Valley), bclrb No. B147/93).
127. Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Proceedings of the 35th Parliament, 2nd 
Session, 30 May 1993, 6625–76, 6627.
128. bctf, The Steps 
129. Educational Programs Continuation Act, 1993, S.B.C. 1993, c. 3. 
130. bcpsea, Report to the Minister, 9.
131. Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Proceedings of the 35th Parliament, 2nd 
Session, 30 May 1993, 6626, 6627.
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Era of Reform: 1994
Bill 31 was part of the ndp government’s fundamental reorganization of 
public sector labour relations in 1994. The ndp government was not immune 
to one of the fundamental difficulties of governing: providing public services 
with limited financial resources. The government sought to increase public 
sector accountability with these changes.  This introduced a delayed era of 
restraint for teachers. It was the first step in what continues to be the progres-
sive reduction of teacher labour relations rights in BC.
In 1992 the ndp government struck the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Public Service and Public Sector, under Commissioner Judi Korbin. The 
Commission was tasked with examining the province’s public sector human 
resources practices, and recommending a new framework for balancing the 
public’s demands for services with government’s fiscal limitations.132  
The perception of a power imbalance between bctf locals and school boards 
in local negotiations was a key issue before the Commission.133 School boards 
sought more centralized bargaining, while bctf strongly urged continuation 
of local bargaining, arguing that centralization would harm management and 
teachers. bctf contended centralization would reduce flexibility at the local 
level, reduce autonomy of management and teachers, potentially remove any 
meaningful role for trustees, and reduce worker participation, thus alienating 
and frustrating teachers and reducing productivity. bctf warned this would 
make job action – legal and illegal – more likely.134
In its 9 July 1993 final report, the Commission did not propose a specific 
bargaining structure for K–12 education, but did recommend greater central 
coordination and control of bargaining.135 A few weeks later the ndp gov-
ernment legislated widespread changes to public sector labour relations, 
including the K–12 education sector. The Minister of Labour explained that 
the purpose of the restructuring was to provide a “framework of coordination 
and accountability to the government.”136
Regarding this change from local to province-wide bargaining, a labour 
relations expert later offered the following evaluation:
Whether or not the prescription of province-wide bargaining between the bctf and 
bcpsea was the right thing to do, it is significant that the government of the day [the ndp] 
chose to do so. That a government which had received significant support from teachers in 
the previous election chose to proceed over the objections of the bctf speaks to elements 
132. BC, The Public Sector in British Columbia, Terms of Reference. 
133. BC, The Public Sector in British Columbia, F20.
134. BC, The Public Sector in British Columbia, F17.
135. British Columbia, Towards a Better Teacher Bargaining Model, 5; BC, The Public Sector in 
British Columbia, C11.
136. Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Proceedings of the 35th Parliament, 2nd 
Session, 21 July 1993, 9017.
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which transcend partisan politics, left-right labels, and pro-labour versus pro-management 
sympathies. There is something about the reality of providing public education, and what 
the public expects of its government, that exerts a powerful influence on how any govern-
ment behaves.137
A package of legislation established the Public Sector Employers’ Council 
(psec) and employers’ associations in six sectors of the public sector, including 
the BC Public School Employers’ Association (bcpsea).138 psec’s role was to 
“set and coordinate strategic directions in human resource management and 
labour relations” and to “provide ongoing consultation between public sector 
employers and representatives of public sector employees on policy issues.”139 
Sectoral employers’ associations were charged with coordinating labour rela-
tions and human resource issues among members, and membership was 
mandatory for public sector employers. bcpsea was made the statutory 
bargaining agent for all school boards and bctf the statutory agent for all 
teachers.140 In order to take “the pressure … off” school boards, the legislation 
prohibited local strikes and permitted only provincial work stoppages.141
The legislation provided that all cost provisions would be negotiated provin-
cially, specifying that this included salaries, benefits, workload, working time 
and paid leave, where these affected the costs of the collective agreement.142 
bctf and bcpsea were then left to agree on where to negotiate the remain-
ing, non-cost, issues: at the provincial or local tables.143 bcpsea and bctf 
quickly came to agreement in April 1995 about the location of bargaining for 
all but one matter, performance evaluations, which was resolved by arbitra-
tion.144 The parties agreed on a predominantly provincial split of issues. All 
substantive matters, including monetary provisions, would be negotiated pro-
vincially.145 Only matters with limited importance and no monetary impact 
would be negotiated at local tables.146 A former bctf President says, “The fact 
137. British Columbia, Towards a Better Teacher Bargaining Model, 5–6.
138. Public Sector Employers Act, S.B.C. 1993, c. 65; Public Education Labour Relations Act, 
S.B.C. 1994, c. 21 (pelra).
139. Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Proceedings of the 35th Parliament, 2nd 
Session, 21 July 1993, 9017.
140. pelra. 
141. bctf, History, 5.
142. pelra, ss.7(3)-7(4).
143. pelra, s. 7(2).
144. bcpsea, Public Policy: Teacher-Public School Employer Bargaining Process Integration 
2011, Discussion Paper, 16 March 2010, 3.
145. bcpsea, Letter of Understanding 1: Designation of Provincial and Local Matters, n.d., 
http://www.bcpsea.bc.ca/documents/LoU%20No%20%201%20-20Appendices%201-2%20-%20
Split%20of%20Issues.pdf (1 February 2011).
146. bcpsea, Letter of Understanding 1.
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is that we really have provincial bargaining because all of the important issues 
are at the provincial table,” and a former negotiator agrees that “anything of 
any consequence is provincial really.”147 A bcpsea representative says that he 
was told that both parties were reluctant to leave the remaining issues to be 
negotiated by the local bodies.148
Today, the provincial-local split of issues remains as set out in the original 
Letter of Understanding. bctf’s apparent willingness to agree to predominantly 
provincial negotiations appears puzzling at first, because its determination 
to return all matters to local-level bargaining has characterized its position 
ever since. In recent pre-bargaining discussions, the bctf President has called 
bctf’s agreement on the split of issues a mistake.149 However, predominantly 
provincial bargaining of important issues is consistent with bctf’s history 
of highly coordinated, centralized bargaining with a province-wide agenda. 
bctf’s regret may be that it miscalculated bcpsea’s greater effectiveness as a 
bargaining opponent, compared to the more tractable school boards, when 
agreeing to the split of issues.  
Era of Reprieve: 1994–2001
Rose describes the public sector, generally, as subject to a period of 
retrenchment beginning in 1990, with governments consolidating earlier 
restrictions in the years after 1998. BC teachers had a markedly different 
experience between 1994 and 2001. Following the 1994 public sector labour 
relations reorganization, rather than enforcing this new accountability and 
cost-control structure on teachers, the ndp offered bctf “a reprieve” in the 
next two bargaining rounds. Critics regarded these as special deals for the 
ndp’s friends, and this would colour the succeeding Liberal government’s 
approach to teacher negotiations. Between 1994 and 2001, two rounds of 
negotiations took place under this new provincial bargaining model, both 
involving government intervention.  It is noteworthy that these two sets of 
negotiations occurred under ndp governments, the first held in the shadow of 
an upcoming provincial election, and the second after the ndp was re-elected 
by a slim margin. 
Conveniently, most local teachers’  agreements expired 30 June 1994, dove-
tailing with the new public sector bargaining legislation coming into force.150 
A significant challenge facing this first round of two-tier negotiations was 
that the legislation offered no guidance for transforming the 75 existing local 
agreements into a single province-wide agreement. Nor did it require that this 
147. Irene Lanzinger, interview by author; Anonymous, interview by author.
148. Finlayson, interview.
149. Finlayson, interview.
150. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 22.
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round of bargaining produce a single provincial contract.151  The two bargain-
ing agents had very different expectations about the starting point for this first 
round of negotiations under the new centralized structure. From the outset, 
psec made clear that it had allocated limited funds for a settlement in educa-
tion.152 bcpsea took what it described as a “blank slate” approach, reflecting its 
view that “the parties were essentially creating a first collective agreement.”153 
A member of the negotiating team characterizes the approach as an effort to 
“gut every significant provision of a collective agreement.”154 Another bcpsea 
representative explained that school boards, feeling they had been victims in 
local bargaining, mistakenly viewed this first two-tier round as “an opportu-
nity … to level that playing field.”155 At the same time, school boards wanted 
to take an interest-based approach to negotiations to improve relations with 
teachers. As one bcpsea negotiator described it, their approach was that “we 
wanted to gut their collective agreements and hug them as we’re doing it.”156 
In contrast, the bctf adopted a “no concessions” approach, taking the 
earlier local collective agreements as their starting point for negotiations.157 
Some commentators interpret bctf’s demands for “best benefits for all” as a 
reflection of bctf’s inability to manage differences among locals unwilling to 
trade-off any gains they had achieved at local bargaining.158
Negotiations commenced in May 1995 and continued through April of the 
following year, with little progress. In the meantime, in February 1996, ndp 
Premier Michael Harcourt resigned, and Glen Clark stepped in as Premier. 
With a support-staff strike imminent in Surrey School District, growing labour 
disputes with the province’s nurses and college instructors, and a May pro-
vincial election looming, the ndp government passed emergency legislation 
in April to end the Surrey dispute.  Bill 21, applying to education and health 
care, deemed recommendations of an lrc-appointed industrial inquiry com-
missioner or mediator to be the collective agreement, subject to any matters 
the parties had agreed to, or subsequently agreed to vary.159 Finance Minister 
Elizabeth Cull explained that Bill 21 was meant to ensure that “kids could go 
151. Halliday, interview.  In contrast, the health sector was statutorily required to achieve a 
single provincial collective agreement in its first round of provincial bargaining.
152. Lawton et al., Teachers’ Unions in Canada, 95.
153. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 23.
154. Halliday, interview.
155. Finlayson, interview.
156. Halliday, interview.
157. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 23.
158. Lawton et al., Teachers’ Unions in Canada, 95–6.
159. Education and Health Collective Bargaining Assistance Act, S.B.C. 1996, c. 1. Self-repealed 
30 June 1996 (ehcba). 
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to school and patients could get health care” while the legislature was unavail-
able during the election period.160 Critics, including many school boards, 
regarded the Bill as a crude ploy to avoid labour disruption and attendant bad 
publicity during an election, and charged that the province couldn’t afford 
these “rich settlements” granted to the ndp’s union supporters.161 Perhaps tell-
ingly, Bill 21 was “only mildly criticized by labor.”162 
Against this backdrop of threatened contract imposition the government 
engaged in direct discussions with bctf offering a modest, two per cent salary 
increase. Some commentators suggest bctf accepted this deal because it rec-
ognized that teachers would benefit from an ndp reelection.163 The resulting 
“Transitional Collective Agreement” (tca) was not really a provincial col-
lective agreement. It simply provided that the pre-existing local agreements 
would remain in force, except for certain wage and salary provisions.164 Class-
sizes would be addressed later in a committee chaired by the Deputy Minister 
of Education. bcpsea and bctf promoted the tca as a means of avoiding a 
destructive labour dispute and giving the parties a period of stability to negoti-
ate a new provincial agreement, and recommended that their members accept 
the agreement.165 Many school boards vehemently and publicly opposed the 
proposal and its significant cost implications, but ultimately voted 54 per cent 
in favour of accepting the transitional agreement.166  
Teacher negotiations resumed in March 1997, as required by the tca, 
and well before its 30 June 1998 expiry. The ndp remained in power, though 
re-elected with only six more seats than the Socred Opposition in the May 
1996 election. The parties resumed their “blank-slate” and “no concessions” 
positions in this round of negotiations, and bctf remained determined 
to use existing local agreements, and therefore the tca, as the baseline for 
bargaining.167 The pre-existing problem of converting the local agreements 
160. Frank Luba and Barbara McLintock, “Sweeping Labor Law Attacked by Liberals,” The 
Province, 28 April 1996, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/ (1 April 2011). 
161. Luba and McLintock, “Sweeping Labor Law Attacked by Liberals”; Justine Hunter and 
Tom Barrett, “New Labor Law Promises Peace During Election: Opposition Members Say the 
Legislation Allows the ndp to Give its Friends in the Unions Favorable Contract Settlements,” 
The Vancouver Sun, 27 April 1996, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/ (1 April 
2011).  Years later, in the context of a court proceeding, representatives of the successor Liberal 
government contended that the tca was only for the purpose of getting through the election 
period without a labour dispute (bctf v. BC 2011, para. 95).
162. Hunter & Barrett, “New Labor Law Promises Peace During Election.”
163. Lawton et al., Teachers’ Unions in Canada, 95.
164. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 24.
165. William Boei, “Two Union Votes to Test Clark’s Will: Health-care, Education Pacts on the 
Line,” The Vancouver Sun, 30 May 1996.
166. Boei, “Two Union Votes to Test Clark’s Will.”
167. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 25.
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into a single provincial agreement was exacerbated by the December 1996 
amalgamation of 75 districts into 59 and addition of a Francophone Education 
Authority.168 This compounded the difficulty of achieving a true provincial 
agreement rather than a collection of local ones, because now many of the 
newly-defined districts faced the additional challenge of dealing with multiple 
local teacher agreements in a single district.169
In February 1998, the ndp government and psec again bypassed bcpsea, 
this time negotiating directly with bctf and without the knowledge or par-
ticipation of bcpsea.170 Accounts differ about how this came about: whether 
arising from a request by, or an offer to, bcpsea for bargaining assistance, or 
whether both parties invited government involvement.171 An employers’ nego-
tiator attributes this intervention to the ndp government’s determination to 
achieve a patterned settlement throughout the public sector. K–12 education 
was the first sector contract to expire, therefore the government wanted to 
use these negotiations as the model to establish its desired compensation pat-
tern.172 Similarly, a bcpsea representative says the government had three goals 
for this round of teacher bargaining: getting a deal, getting bargaining over 
with, and setting the stage for its compensation mandate.173 
On 17 April 1998 the bctf and psec signed two documents: an Agreement 
in Committee (aic) and a Memorandum of Agreement in K–3 Primary Class 
Size (moa).174 One of the bcpsea negotiators recalls that the government had 
invited bcpsea representatives to attend a meeting in Victoria that day and, 
just before the meeting, bcpsea’s Executive Director received a phone call 
telling him that there had been an announcement on the news that psec and 
bctf had an agreement. This negotiator says that was “news to us” and “so the 
meeting was to tell us what was in the agreement.”175 
The aic included all provisions of the tca except those expressly amend-
ed.176 The moa, with a 30 June 2001 termination date, provided fixed class 
168. Done by an Amalgamation Order of the Lieutenant Governor in Council under s. 190 
of the School Act, abolishing currently existing school districts and establishing a new school 
district. See Miscellaneous Statute Amendment Act, 1996, S.B.C. 1996, c. 13, s. 29.
169. Halliday, interview.
170. Halliday, interview. See bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #25, 6 March 1998, <http://bctf.ca/pub-
lications/BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=1742> (1 February 2011), reporting that bcpsea requested 
this assistance. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 25. 
171. Halliday, interview; bctf v. BC 2011, para. 99.
172. Halliday, interview.
173. Finlayson, interview.
174. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #27, 20 April 1998, <http://bctf.ca/publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=1746> (1 February 2011); Finlayson, interview.
175. Halliday, interview.
176. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #27; bctf, The Steps. 
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sizes for kindergarten to grade three, and funding for reduced class sizes.177 
bctf described the aic as meeting its key objective of preventing “contract 
stripping,” and recommended ratification to its membership.178  In contrast, 
bcpsea opposed the aic and urged school districts to reject the agreement. 
One bcpsea negotiator says he had “never seen an agreement as poorly con-
ceived as this … but [the government] got a deal. And they got a deal that fit the 
pattern that the government was trying to establish.”179 Primary among school 
board concerns were that the terms tied their hands, ignored their concerns, 
and lacked certainty and regulation of costs: school boards voted 86 per cent 
in favour of rejecting the agreements.180
However, bctf refused to renegotiate and threatened to call a strike.181 
Shortly thereafter the government introduced Bill 39, deeming the aic terms 
to be the provincial collective agreement and carried over the class size moa, in 
force from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001.182 The Minister of Education explained 
that with the new school year only 76 days away, government intervention was 
needed to protect students.183 
Joining the Era of Consolidation: 2001 to 2006
On 16 May 2001 the Liberals captured all but two seats in the Legislature in 
the provincial election. This change in government brought the era of reprieve 
for teachers to an end, and teachers joined other public sector workers in an 
era of consolidation. Premier Gordon Campbell’s new government was deter-
mined to exert strong control over fiscal, labour, and education policy matters. 
This occurred in the broader context of a faltering provincial economy, pro-
ducing a particularly negative fiscal and economic environment for public 
sector bargaining. Labour relations reform also featured prominently in 
Campbell’s “New Era” agenda, and the government quickly introduced wide-
ranging changes to labour relations. Among the first of these were the August 
2001 amendments to the lrc, which included reintroducing explicit essential 
177. Finlayson, interview. The parties later agreed to renew the moa, effectively removing this 
termination date.
178. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #27.
179. Halliday, interview.
180. Bolan, “Minister’s Move to Impose Teachers’ Deal Draws Fire”; Halliday, interview; bcp-
sea, Historical Perspectives, 26. 
181. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #46.
182. 182. Public Education Collective Agreement Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 41 (Bill 39). The govern-
ment later unsuccessfully tried to argue that because it, rather than bcpsea, negotiated the 
agreement and because the agreement was ultimately legislated it was not a freely negotiated 
collective agreement and, therefore, not subject to Charter scrutiny (bctf v. BC 2011, paras. 
105, 201).
183. Bolan, “Minister’s Move to Impose Teachers’ Deal Draws Fire.”
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service restrictions for education.184 The first round of teacher negotiations in 
this new era also marked the beginning of a new set of bctf tactics character-
ized by a very aggressive, multi-faceted, long-term political and legal strategy.
In February 2001 bctf and bcpsea signed an amended moa incorporating 
class size provisions for kindergarten to grade three into the existing collective 
agreement. bctf wanted to ensure that these class size limits were included 
in the collective agreement, itself, so that it would become part of the upcom-
ing bargaining. The government had pressured bcpsea to agree by suggesting 
that, if it refused to incorporate the moa into the collective agreement, the 
government might withdraw $43 million in funding earmarked for school dis-
tricts based on the class size moa. bcpsea did agree, and 80 per cent of school 
districts voted to ratify the amendment.185
Bargaining began in March 2001, and bcpsea’s negotiating position was 
shaped by its view that it needed to restore flexibility and discretion for school 
boards that had been removed by the two earlier bargains with the ndp gov-
ernment.186 Negotiations soon faltered, with bctf characterizing bcpsea’s 
positions as “concessionary” and “contract-stripping.”187 In September, bctf 
threatened a strike vote unless there was substantial progress in bargaining.188 
Unlike the ndp, a strike threat did not prompt this government to settle, 
although one difference was the time of year: this dispute occurred in early 
fall, posing little threat to students’ school year. Instead, bcpsea sought lrb 
essential service designations to limit strike action. Although essential service 
provisions had long been available in teacher disputes, this would be the first 
time they were actually applied. bctf served strike notice on 5 November and 
its multi-stage job action commenced with withdrawal of non-essential ser-
vices on 8 November. In early December bctf announced that, beginning 7 
January 2002, it would expand job action to include all voluntary activities.189 
By late November 2001, negotiations had stalled. The government appointed 
Richard Longpre, Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour and a former bclrb 
184. Skills Development and Labour Statutes Amendment Act, 2001, S.B.C. 2001, c. 33; Labour 
Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244, s. 72. 
185. bctf v. BC 2001, paras. 111, 113–4. The government later argued that this was not a freely 
negotiated agreement because bcpsea only agreed under threat of losing funding. Rejecting 
this argument, and noting that bcpsea could have refused, the BC Supreme Court observed 
that “It seems a strange position for the government to take: that it forced bcpsea to sign an 
agreement against its will.” (bctf v. BC 2011, paras. 205–6).
186. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 28, 29, 32.
187. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #25; bctf, The Steps. 
188. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #33, 4 September 2001, <http://bctf.ca/ publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=1852> (10 March 2011).
189. bcpsea, [2001] bclrb Nos. B383/2001, B431/2001; bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #73, 22 
November 2001, <http://bctf.ca/publications/BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=1932> (10 March 
2011).
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Vice-Chair, as a fact-finder. bctf questioned Longpre’s neutrality and charged 
that this intrusion into bargaining would hamper negotiations.190 After unsuc-
cessful meetings with Longpre the parties met separately several times with 
facilitator Stephen Kelleher, former acting lrb Chair, to little effect.191  In 
January, bctf filed an lrb complaint, charging bcpsea and the government 
with bad faith bargaining.192 This complaint was quickly rendered moot by 
government intervention.  
On 18 January 2002 Premier Campbell issued an ultimatum, warning 
that the dispute would be resolved by the end of the next week, and that he 
had instructed the Minister of Labour to deal with the matter.193 A few days 
later, on 23 January 2002, Labour Minister Graham Bruce declared there was 
no hope for a negotiated settlement, saying that “it’s just not in the realm 
of possibility.”194 After more than 60 negotiating sessions, the parties had 
agreed on only a handful of minor items.195 That same day, thousands of stu-
dents walked-out of classes across the province, protesting teachers’ earlier 
announcement of withdrawal of extra-curricular activities.196 
The government now took action. On Friday, 25 January 2002, it introduced 
a series of bills addressing public sector labour relations and the teachers’ 
dispute specifically. All were passed by the end of the Legislature’s weekend 
sitting.197 Bill 27 imposed a new collective agreement for teachers, rolling-
over the expired agreement to 30 June 2004, including all terms agreed to 
during negotiations and a 7.5 per cent salary increase over the three years of 
the agreement.
190. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #74, 23 November 2001, <http://bctf.ca/ publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=1934> (10 March 2011). 
191. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #74; bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #77, 29 November 2001, 
<http://bctf.ca/ publications/BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=1940> (10 March 2011); bctf, 
Bargaining Bulletin #80, 12 December 2001, <http://bctf.ca/ publications/BargainingBulletin.
aspx?id=1946> (10 March 2011).
192. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #86; 22 January 2002, <http://www.bctf.ca/publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=1958> (10 March 2011); bcpsea,[2002] bclrb No. B340/2002.  
193. bctf, The Steps; Janet Steffenhagen, “Campbell to Educators: Settle by Friday,” The 
Vancouver Sun, 19 January 2002.   
194. Craig McInnes, “Legislature to Resolve B.C. Teachers’ Dispute’,” The Vancouver Sun, 24 
January 2002.
195. Janet Steffenhagen, “Teachers’ Action Plan Halts lrb Challenge,” The Vancouver Sun, 5 
February 2002.
196. Janet Steffenhagen, “Thousands of students walk out: They huddled in the cold to protest 
teachers’ contract impasse,” The Vancouver Sun, 24 January 2002.
197. Education Services Collective Agreement Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 1 (Bill 27); Public Education 
Flexibility and Choice Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 3 (Bill 28); Health and Social Services Delivery 
Improvement Act, 2nd Sess., S.B.C. 2002, c. 2 (Bill 29).
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Bill 28 substantially reduced the scope of teachers’ bargaining. It explic-
itly provided that the employers’ right to determine matters including class 
size and composition, course assignment, length of instructional day and year, 
and workload and staffing ratios, would prevail over any collective agreement 
or legislative provisions.198 Though disputes arising from Bill 28 were to be 
determined by arbitration, these rights could not be restrained by an injunc-
tion, prohibition or stay of proceedings of an arbitrator or the lrb, and these 
amendments would prevail over any inconsistent lrc provisions.199 With Bill 
28, government used its legislative power to permanently remove some of 
the most contentious issues from the realm of negotiations. This government 
action was not so much about cost control, but an attempt to finally end what 
had been an ongoing struggle between governments of all stripes and the bctf 
for control over what the government regarded as matters of managerial dis-
cretion and public policy, and which bctf considered vital bargaining issues 
representing teachers’ fundamental working conditions. These Bills were met 
with widespread and angry reaction from public sector unions, including a 
province-wide, illegal teachers’ strike on Monday, 28 January 2002.200 This also 
marked a new phase in bctf’s labour relations strategies. It established a multi-
faceted five year plan, gauged to extend beyond the next election, which Sims 
describes as “legal, political, internal and external.”201  bctf’s “Action Plan” 
called on teachers to participate in ongoing job action in the schools, such as 
refusing to purchase school supplies, provide report cards, or mark standard-
ized exams.202 A longer-term “fight-back” campaign allocated $4 million to 
pursue a broad political campaign against the Liberal government, in alliance 
198. Public Education Flexibility and Choice Act, s. 2.
199. bctf later successfully challenged the Bill 28 arbitration under judicial review. However, 
the government simply passed legislation enacting the quashed arbitral award (bctf v. bcpsea, 
2004 bcsc 86; Education Services Collective Agreement Amendment Act, 2004, S.B.C. 2004, c. 
17 (escaa)). Ultimately, in 2011, the BC Supreme Court struck down Bill 28 and the escaa as 
unconstitutional (bctf v. BC, 2011 bcsc 469).    
200. bctf, Negotiations 2001 to 2002, 2008, <http://bctf.ca/AboutUs.
aspx?id=18888&printPage=true> (10 March 2011); bcpsea obtained an lrb interim order 
enjoining the planned illegal strike (bcpsea, [2002] bclrb No. B34/2002, upheld on judicial 
review: Hospital Employees’ Union v. Health Employers’ Assn. of British Columbia, 2007 bcsc 
372.
201. Jinny Sims, “Labour Rights and the Public” (plenary presentation at the Jobs & Justice 
Conference, Burnaby, BC, March 29–31, 2007) <http://www.workingtv.com/jobs&justice.html> 
(10 March 2011).
202. Steffenhagen, “Teachers’ Action Plan Halts lrb Challenge.” 
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with other labour and social groups.203 bctf also sought to strengthen ties 
with the bcfl and other social agencies.204 
An additional bctf strategy was to start talking to teachers about how to 
respond to future government legislative interventions. This became what 
former President Irene Lanzinger calls a “three year conversation” bctf had 
with teachers in preparation to defy future back-to-work legislation.205 To 
build  teachers’ confidence, bctf prepared fold-out speaking notes addressing 
issues of class size, salaries, bargaining, what bctf had lost in 2002, and sug-
gested questions and answers. bctf asked teachers to approach five people a 
week to discuss these issues. Sims says teachers “began to feel good about that 
and they kind of liked it. People didn’t dump on them.”206 bctf also organized 
a “Charter” group to travel the province, engaging the public in discussions 
about the value of public education and providing a forum for teachers to hear 
from supportive community members.207
In May 2002 bctf filed a Charter challenge of Bills 27, 28, 19 and 33 and the 
Bills’ removal of working and learning conditions from a negotiated collective 
agreement and the scope of bargaining. 208 bctf also joined other organiza-
tions to launch a series of ilo complaints over the government’s public sector 
legislation. In spring 2003 the ilo concluded that all six statutes violated 
freedom of association and requested that the government amend Bills 27 and 
28, and amend or repeal other statutes.209 
bcpsea’s bargaining strategy during this round had been influenced by its 
discovery that there was strong support within the government to statuto-
rily remove class size, composition and non-enrolling ratios from the scope of 
bargaining. By November 2001, unbeknownst to bctf, bcpsea was discuss-
ing this draft legislation with government.210 In spite of this close and regular 
communication about education policy between bcpsea and the government 
203. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #87, 4 February 2002, <http://bctf.ca/ publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=1960> (10 March 2011); Jeff Rud, “Teachers Soften Contract 
Demands,” Times Colonist, 1 September 2005; Janet Steffenhagen, “bctf Organizing for Long 
Battle with Government: ‘Teaching for Social Justice’ to Become a More Important Part of 
Instructors’ Practice,” The Vancouver Sun, 8 March 2002.  
204. Sims, “Labour Rights and the Public.” 
205. Lanzinger, interview.
206. Sims, “Labour Rights and the Public.” 
207. Sims, “Labour Rights and the Public.” 
208. The claim was later amended to challenge bcpsea’s refusal to negotiate working and 
learning conditions in the next round of negotiations. Finally heard by the Supreme Court in 
November 2010, the decision was issued on 13 April 2011 (bctf v. BC, 2011) and is discussed 
later in this article.
209. ilo Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 330: Canada (Geneva 2003), Dec. 
2166, 2173, 2180, and 2196.
210. bctf v. BC 2011, paras. 170–2.
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throughout negotiations, a decade later, the BC Supreme Court rejected 
bctf’s allegation that the government had acted in concert with bcpsea to 
cause it to negotiate in bad faith. The Court found no evidence that the govern-
ment either directed bcpsea’s negotiations or directed bcpsea to undermine 
negotiations.211 However, the Court did find that bcpsea was aware during 
negotiations that government would likely pass legislation in its favour affect-
ing class size, composition and non-enrolling ratios. As a result, bcpsea had 
little incentive to compromise and was likely engaging in hard bargaining. The 
court concluded that “This most likely was a key contributing factor for the 
lack of progress in collective bargaining in 2001,” but that this government 
conduct was not properly characterized “acting in concert with bcpsea to 
engage in bad faith bargaining.”212
When bargaining resumed in November 2004, bctf’s anti-Liberal cam-
paign was fully underway in preparation for the upcoming provincial election. 
In the 28 days before the 17 May 2005 election, bctf spent about $875,000 
on advertising, making it the highest-spending registered election advertis-
ing sponsor in the province.213 bctf was determined to regain full scope of 
bargainable issues in this round and restore working and learning condition 
provisions that Bill 28 had “stripped” from the collective agreement, and win 
a substantial salary increase.214 bcpsea’s position was that it could not nego-
tiate matters removed from bargaining by Bill 28. Moreover, psec had set a 
“net zero” compensation mandate across the public sector despite the healthy 
economy and large predicted surplus.215 Therefore, from the very beginning of 
this round, bctf was demanding that bcpsea negotiate both outside its fiscal 
mandate and outside its legal authority. bctf simultaneously attacked bcpsea 
for its position and appealed to it as an advocate for teachers.216 In the midst 
of bargaining, the Liberals won the May election, though with a significantly 
reduced majority.
Frustrated with bcpsea’s refusal to negotiate excluded matters, by September 
2005 bctf was seeking parallel discussions with government about working 
and learning conditions, rather than trying to return these matters to the 
211. bctf v. BC 2011, paras. 180–1.
212. bctf v. BC 2011, paras. 183, 185.
213. bctf v. British Columbia (Attorney General), paras. 4, 139.
214. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #15, 6 June 2005, <http://cms.bctf.ca/publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=2094> (1 February 2011).
215. bcpsea, Historical Perspective, 39.
216. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #3, 25 January 2005, <http://cms.bctf.ca/publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=2070> (1  February 2011); bctf. Bargaining Bulletin #6, 17 
February 2005, <http://cms.bctf.ca/publications/BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=2076> (1 February 
2011).
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bargaining table.217 This contrasts with bargaining under the ndp government, 
in which it was the government rather than the teachers that bypassed bcpsea 
for direct negotiations. Education Minister Shirley Bond agreed to meet to 
discuss classroom conditions, but would not agree to a “special negotiating 
track” and would not revisit the question of returning class size to the nego-
tiations.218 All involved – bcpsea, bctf, and the government – were losing 
patience and by September 2005 it was evident that there was little prospect of 
a voluntary resolution to this impasse.219
On 19 September the Minister appointed a fact-finder, Associate Deputy 
Minister of Labour Rick Connolly, to assess the prospect of success of further 
negotiations. Connolly’s 30 September 2005 report concluded that there was 
no prospect for a voluntary resolution of these negotiations because of the 
parties’ differences on the issues of compensation and negotiability of working 
and learning conditions.220
Meanwhile, bctf had held a strike vote, with 88.4 per cent of teachers voting 
to strike. The first part of bctf’s three-phase plan for job action commenced 
September 28, with teachers withdrawing from specific administrative duties, 
subject to Labour Board essential service orders.221 Again bcpsea applied for 
essential service restrictions.
The Minister of Labour blamed the bargaining structure for the negotia-
tions breakdown, contending that the Connolly report “confirmed that we 
have a broken bargaining system and we will not see negotiated settlements 
until that system is fixed.”222 On 3 October 2005 the government introduced 
217. bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #15, 6 June 2005, <http://cms.bctf.ca/publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=2094> (1 February 2011); bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #18, 23 
June 2005, <http://cms.bctf.ca/publications/BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=2100> (1 February 
2011); bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #20, 14 September 2005, <http://cms.bctf.ca/publications/
BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=2104> (1 February 2011); bctf, Bargaining Bulletin #1, 9 December 
2004 <http://cms.bctf.ca/publications/BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=2066> (1 February 2011); 
Jinny Sims, “Teachers Will Keep Pressing for Better Learning Conditions,” The Vancouver Sun, 
6 September 2005.
218. Jeff Rud, “Teachers Soften Contract Demands,” Times Colonist, 1 September 2005.
219. Janet Steffenhagen, “Teachers’ Contract Dispute Irreconcilable, Employer Says,” The 
Vancouver Sun, 16 September 2005; Glenn Bohn, “Labour Minister to Meet With Teachers, 
Employers,” The Vancouver Sun, 17 September 2005; British Columbia. Ministry of Labour and 
Citizen’s Services, A Fact Finding Report on the Current Collective Bargaining Dispute Between 
the BC Public School Employers’ Association and the BC Teachers’ Federation (Victoria 2005), 4.
220. British Columbia, Ministry of Labour and Citizen’s Services, A Fact Finding Report on the 
Current Collective Bargaining Dispute Between the BC Public School Employers’ Association 
and the BC Teachers’ Federation (Victoria 2005), 4.
221. bctf, “Teachers’  Strike Vote a Resounding ‘Yes’,” 23 September 2005 <http://bctf.ca/
NewsReleases.aspx?id=1624> (10 March 2011); bcpsea, bclrb Decisions No. B255/2005 and 
B262/2005. 
222. British Columbia, Ministry of Labour and Citizens’ Services, “Long-Term Solution Sought 
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Bill 12, the Teachers’ Collective Agreement Act and it was passed four days 
later. Bill 12 renewed the expired collective agreement until June 30, 2006.223 
The Minister explained that this was meant to give the parties “breathing 
space” and time for a new bargaining process to be formulated before bar-
gaining resumed.224 The Minister announced that an Industrial Inquiry 
Commissioner would be appointed to develop a new bargaining process to be 
instituted for the resumption of negotiations, soon appointing Vince Ready, a 
respected arbitrator, Commissioner.225 
In an effort to keep working and learning conditions out of bargaining, the 
Minister of Education then announced creation of a “Learning Roundtable” as 
a permanent, non-bargaining, multi-stakeholder forum for discussion of class 
size, composition and related issues. However, bctf refused to participate. 
The Minister also announced an annual Teachers’ Congress as a forum for 
teachers and others to have direct discussions with government.226 
The bctf immediately responded with a 5 October 2005 membership vote, 
producing 90.5 per cent of votes cast in favour of taking “a stand in protest 
against Bill 12.”227 Lanzinger credits the even higher teacher support for Bill 
12 action than in the earlier strike vote to bctf’s years of preparing teachers 
to defy back-to-work legislation, saying: “It was almost like a slam-dunk … 
because we’d had this three-year conversation … people were just ready….”228 
bctf then led a province-wide, illegal teachers’ strike that began on 7 
October and continued for ten school days, to 23 October 2005. This was the 
largest teacher work stoppage in BC’s history and among the largest teachers’ 
work stoppages in any province, resulting in 380,000 lost working days.229 bctf 
for Teacher Bargaining,” 3 October 2005, <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-
2009/2005LCS0014-000888.htm> (10 March 2011).
223. Teachers’ Collective Agreement Act, S.B.C. 2005, c. 27. 
224. British Columbia, Ministry of Labour and Citizens’ Services, “Long-Term Solution Sought 
for Teacher Bargaining,” 3 October 2005, <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-
2009/2005LCS0014-000888.htm> (10 March 2011).
225. British Columbia, Ministry of Labour and Citizens’ Services, “Commission Appointed to 
Improve Teacher Bargaining,” 6 October 2005, <http://www.bcpsea.bc.ca/access/emplgroups/
teacher/bargreview_wr/ready/newsbgdrissuevr/ministrynews-oct0605.pdf> (10 March 2011); 
British Columbia. Ministry of Labour and Citizens’ Services, “Industrial Inquiry Commissioner 
Terms of Reference,” 6 October 2005, <http://www.bcpsea.bc.ca/access/emplgroups/teacher/
bargreview_wr/ready/newsbgdrissuevr/reference-oct605.pdf> (10 March 2011).
226. British Columbia, Ministry of Education, “Government Commits to New Learning 
Roundtable,” 6 October 2005, <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-
2009/2005EDU0086-000908.htm> (10 March 2011).
227. bctf, “Teachers Vote to Take a Stand in Protest of Bill 12,” 5 October 2005, <http://bctf.
ca/NewsReleases.aspx?id=1634> (1 February 2011).
228. Lanzinger, interview.
229. hrsdc, Special data request.
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and its members defied an lrb order to return to work.230 bcpsea pursued civil 
contempt proceedings, resulting in a $500,000 fine against bctf. A monitor 
was appointed, at bctf’s expense, and its assets were restrained, to ensure it 
complied with the Court’s order. With bctf’s formidable $30 million in assets 
and $14.6 million collective bargaining defense fund, the Court warned that 
the fine could have been much higher.231
On 17 October 2005, Commissioner Ready’s mandate was expanded to 
include facilitating teachers’ return to work. Within a few days, the govern-
ment, bcpsea and bctf had accepted his recommendations and teachers were 
back in their classrooms, with negotiations slated to resume that spring. 
Public support for teachers’ illegal action had been remarkable, and it grew 
rather than diminished over the course of the job action.232 Many school 
boards were also supportive: 26 passed motions calling on the government to 
negotiate with teachers, and some urged the government to repeal Bill 12.233 
Lanzinger recalls “we didn’t know [we would] win [the illegal strike] either, but 
we knew we had to do it. It’s all you can do … there was other choice.” She also 
emphasized that “it looked like we just made that decision” to ignore the back-
to-work legislation and order, but it had its roots in bctf’s 2002 decision to 
begin preparing members to respond to such government action.234 Sims, then 
bctf President, says that the 2005 illegal strike “gave a generation of teachers 
who never participated in any kind of job action or negotiations a real feeling 
of power … that they weren’t the victims, that they actually had something to 
say … gave them a feeling that they had a role to play.”235 Once again, bctf had 
gained strength from adversity, and increased membership support through 
the experience.
The spring 2006 negotiations were highly managed by Commissioner Ready 
and mediator / facilitator Irene Holden.  Although a negotiated agreement was 
reached on 30 June 2006, all of the parties regarded this as artificial and an 
anomaly, reflecting the particular circumstances existing at the time, rather 
than an enduring change in relationships among government, bcpsea and 
bctf.
230. bcpsea, [2005] bclrb No. B295/2005.
231. bcpsea v. bctf, 2005 bcsc 1443; bcpsea v. bctf, 2005 bcsc 1446; bcpsea v. bctf, 2005 
bcsc 1490.
232. Ipsos Reid Corporation, “BC Public Continues To Side With Teachers,” 18 October 2005, 
<http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=2829> (10 March 2011).
233. bctf, “Support Continues to Grow for Teachers,” 13 October 2005, <http://www.bctf.
ca/NewsReleases.aspx?id=1636> (10 March 2011); Lora Grindlay and Jack Keating, “Schools 
Remain Closed as Dispute Drags On,” The Province, 11 October 2005; Janet Steffenhagen and 
Miro Cernetig, “B.C. Students Told to Stay at Home,” Leader Post, 7 October 2005.
234. Lanzinger, interview.
235. Jinny Sims, interview by author.
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Ready’s October 2005 recommendations had removed some contentious 
issues from the table, and infused hundreds of millions of dollars into educa-
tion. Also, in May 2006 Bill 33 established class size and composition limits.236 
All parties were optimistic that this would address teachers’ demands to 
bargain class size and composition. Several external factors encouraged a 
speedy and peaceful settlement. Virtually all public sector contracts were 
expiring in 2006, and the government wanted to avoid labour disruptions 
during the 2009 provincial election and 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics. It 
sought to ensure that public collective agreements expired after those events. 
Moreover, a large, unanticipated provincial surplus allowed psec to establish 
a favourable fiscal mandate, including substantial financial incentives such as 
signing bonuses for agreements reached before expiry of existing contracts.237 
A final important factor was likely Ready’s skill and determination. Ready has 
a reputation for resolving the most intractable disputes. In this case, he report-
edly told parties he was going to force them to negotiate if it was “the last thing 
he did”, and he succeeded.238
In spite of an unsuccessful bctf bad faith bargaining complaint against 
bcpsea’s refusal to negotiate class size and composition and an early June 
bctf strike vote with 85.2 per cent of votes favouring a strike mandate, a five 
year agreement, running to 2011, was reached just hours before the deadline 
for forfeiting the signing bonus.239 The resulting agreement was ratified by 98.7 
per cent of votes cast by school boards, and by 93.4 per cent of teachers who 
voted.240 
The Era of Realignment: 2007 Onwards
In June 2007 the balance between free collective bargaining and govern-
ments’ power to legislate outcomes was suddenly upset with the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s Health Services decision. To the surprise of many the Court over-
turned decades of jurisprudence to find that the Charter-protected freedom 
of association protects the process of good faith collective bargaining.241 This 
236. Education (Learning Enhancement) Statutes Amendment Act, 2006, S.B.C. 2006, c. 21.
237. British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, “Province Sets New Negotiating 
Framework,” 30 November 2005, <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-
2009/2005FIN0023-001112.htm> (10 March 2011).
238. Finlayson, interview.
239. bctf, [2006] bclrb No. B136/2006; bctf, Bargaining Bulletin, #19, 9 June 2006, <http://
bctf.ca/publications/BargainingBulletin.aspx?id=2116> (10 March 2011).
240. bcpsea, Historical Perspectives, 66.
241. Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
2007 scc 27 paras. 19, 90 (“Health Services”) affirmed by Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 
2011 scc 20. Health Services held that Bill 29, passed on the same day in 2002 as Bills 27 and 
28, and which restricted collective bargaining in the health sector, was an unjustifiable, sub-
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decision means that governments are prohibited from substantially interfer-
ing with collective bargaining, such as back-to-work legislation, imposition 
of collective agreement terms, or reducing the scope of bargaining except, 
perhaps, in situations of urgency or exigency. The years following Health 
Services have been a period of uncertainty and realignment, as governments 
adapt to the new constitutional reality that direct legislative intervention may 
not be available whenever the government finds it expedient to resort to it. By 
substantially limiting governments’ frequently used power to simply legislate 
an end to disputes or protracted bargaining, or to impose agreements, this 
change promises to significantly change the character of, and governments’ 
role in, public sector labour relations.
In this era of realignment, Bills 27, 28 and other associated legislation and 
government action have come under Charter scrutiny. In particular, bctf has 
challenged government initiatives in removing working and learning condi-
tions from teachers’ collective agreements and prohibiting bargaining of such 
matters. Until the BC Supreme Court’s April 2011 decision on the matter, the 
government continued to resist returning to the negotiating table those issues 
removed from bargaining by Bill 28. Meanwhile, bctf continued to reject 
and resist non-bargaining alternatives for these matters. It has denounced the 
Learning Roundtable as a “PR exercise” for government, and has withdrawn 
its participation.242 Although the Bill 33 class size legislation was greeted with 
optimism when passed in 2006, bctf not only challenged Bill 33 in its Charter 
case, but has launched numerous grievances relating to what it alleges are 
thousands violations of statutory class size limits.243 
In this challenge to Bills 27, 28 and the Education Services Collective 
Agreement Act (ecca), the Court held that sections of Bill 28 and the ecca 
limiting the scope of teacher collective bargaining by prohibiting collective 
agreement terms relating to class size or composition, student-teacher ratios, 
case and teaching loads and reinstating the arbitral decision on scope after it 
was overturned by the Court, are invalid as contrary to the Charter guarantee 
of the freedom of association, and not a limit demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. The Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for 
12 months to permit the government to address this decision. However, the 
Court found that the challenged provision of Bill 27, which provided for merger 
of local collective agreement schedules following a merger of school districts, 
stantial interference with collective bargaining.
242. bctf, “Teachers Vote to Leave Premier’s Failed Learning Roundtable,” 16 March 2009 
<http://www.bctf.ca/NewsReleases.aspx?id=17908> (10 March 2011). 
243. For the 2006–7 and 2007–8 school years, bctf filed grievances involving 157 schools 
in 18 school districts and 1699 classes. For 2008–09 it grieved 14,000 classes; and, has given 
bcpsea  notice that, instead of policy grievances, it will file class size grievances on a local level 
for the 2010–11 year (bcpsea, Post-Decision: The Emerging Class Size/Composition Resolution 
Process – Process and Consequences, (Vancouver 2010).
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did not violate the freedom of association. The government has chosen not to 
appeal this decision, instead undertaking a consultation process with bctf 
to negotiate implementation of the Court decision.244 bctf has greeted this 
Court decision as a victorious end to the battle it has waged with the Liberal 
government since its 2002 enactment of Bills 27 and 28. However, it remains to 
be seen what real effect this will have on the scope of bargaining and negotia-
tions outcomes. It is a strange irony that in 1987 fear of a Charter ruling that 
ended in an unexpected decision opened the door to full formal labour rights 
for teachers and now, more than 30 years later, it may again be a surprising 
Charter decision that restores those rights to teachers.
More generally, bctf continues to demand a return to local-level bargaining 
and striking. It seeks funding for local negotiations, and to revisit the provin-
cial/local split of issues, proposing moving all issues to the local table but for 
wages, benefits, hours of work and paid leave. bctf has told bcpsea that if it 
does not agree to its proposed split of issues, bctf will achieve it through legal 
action.245 Meanwhile, contending that bcpsea engages in “incessant inter-
ference” in local matters, and unreasonably denies local modifications, bctf 
has “gone underground” to reach informal arrangements with some school 
boards.246 Teachers’ locals are also making centrally-coordinated overtures to 
school boards, seeking their support for changing the local/provincial split 
of issues.247 Once more bctf is pursuing informal routes, and direct deal-
ings outside of the formal bargaining structure, to further its labour relations 
agenda. Therefore, the latest round of teacher negotiations is freighted with 
tremendous uncertainty as well as ongoing disagreements between the parties 
about the fundamental structure of bargaining in this sector.
bctf also continues its political efforts, spending approximately $200,000 
on political advertising in each of its 2006 and 2007 fiscal years.248 In antici-
pation of the 2009 provincial election, the Liberal government passed Bill 42 
imposing third-party election advertising restrictions during 88 days prior 
to a provincial election.249 bctf and other public sector unions succeeded, in 
244. British Columbia, Ministry of Education, “Consultation Begins on Bill 28 Ruling,” 5 May 
2011, <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-2009/2005LCS0014-000888.htm> (5 
May 2011).
245. bctf, “Bargaining 2011: Charting a new course,” May/June 2010 <http://bctf.ca/
publications/NewsmagArticle.aspx?id=21166 > (1 February 2011); bcpsea “@issue 2010-
26: bctf Local Bargaining Initiative,” 6 December 2010 <http://www.bcpsea.bc.ca/docu-
ments/20101228_104424010_ai2010-26.pdf> (1 February 2011); bcpsea, Public Policy: Teacher-
Public School Employer Bargaining Process Integration 2011, Discussion Paper, (Vancouver 
2010), 2.
246. bctf, “Bargaining 2011”; Sims, interview.
247. bcpsea “@issue 2010-26: bctf Local Bargaining Initiative.” 
248. bctf v. BC, 2009, paras. 4, 139.
249. Election Amendment Act, 2008, S.B.C. 2008, c. 41.
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part, in a Charter challenge, arguing that the Bill’s real purpose was to “tilt 
the playing field in favour of the governing party by targeting unions.”250 The 
Court rejected the claim that Bill 42 infringed freedom of association, or the 
right to vote, but the province conceded that it violated freedom of expression, 
and the Court declared certain provisions of Bill 42 of no force and effect. 
Nonetheless, Premier Campbell’s Liberals were re-elected to a third term in 
the 12 May 2009 provincial election.
Conclusion
The bctf has employed an array of strategies to advance teachers’ collec-
tive bargaining rights over the last difficult decades. Perhaps bctf’s defining 
strategy has been its readiness to seek to do informally that which teachers 
are legally restrained from doing formally, coupled with its willingness to 
deal directly with whichever level of government or organization serves its 
purposes, regardless of the formal structures. These are recurring themes in 
bctf’s bargaining history. This was bctf’s approach before 1987, when it held 
very narrow formal bargaining rights, yet dealt directly with school boards 
to reach informal, technically unenforceable agreements on matters beyond 
their legal scope of bargaining. bctf has used similar strategies more recently, 
directly approaching government and school boards, rather than the statutory 
bargaining agent, to advance its labour relations goals. A second, related, theme 
has been bctf’s proactive approach to driving change in labour relations. As 
Kuehn said, describing bctf’s efforts to expand the reach of bargaining in the 
early 1980s, the plan was to “restructure the reality” so that “the law would 
follow.”251 bctf also has a long history of effectively pursuing its labour rela-
tions agenda in multiple legal fora. It has achieved significant success among 
its many Charter challenges and its grievances challenging class size legisla-
tion may force the government to negotiate those issues, simply as a means of 
halting the overwhelming onslaught of litigation. In the process, the bctf has 
also developed into an influential, media-savvy political force.
Overall, bctf exhibits several organizational characteristics that have con-
tributed to its success. It has shown a remarkable ability to coordinate and 
centralize its action, facilitated by its early adoption of communications tech-
nology. This makes it a formidable opponent. Second, bctf takes the long 
view, setting and pursuing labour relations goals that it pursues consistently 
and unflaggingly. It has also shown itself to be a highly adaptable organization, 
altering its strategies to suit changing contexts, and somehow managing to 
draw strength from each set of adversities or setbacks in its history. Central to 
250. bctf v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2009 bcsc 436 (third party election spend-
ing limits); Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students, 
2009 scc 31 (transit authority’s refusal to accept bctf political advertising).
251. Kuehn, interview.
LLT-68.indb   76 11-11-07   4:18 PM
british columbia teachers’ quest for collective bargaining rights   77
bctf’s success has also been its ability to muster grassroots teacher support. 
Several times in its history it has voluntarily, or out of necessity, managed to 
sign up a tremendous proportion of teachers. bctf has also, and against expec-
tations, successfully been able to call upon teachers to engage in legal and 
illegal strikes. The tremendous membership support bctf is able to marshal is 
a key strength of its organization, and cultivating teacher support has become 
an important part of its strategy.
Partly due to bctf’s strategic success, BC teacher labour relations have 
followed a different trajectory than public sector workers have generally experi-
enced since the mid-20th century. Teachers were granted full formal collective 
bargaining rights decades later than most public employees, in 1987, and their 
history continued to be distinct. First, teachers enjoyed their fullest labour 
relations rights during the late 80s and early 90s, when other public sector 
workers were in the grips of periods of restraint and consolidation. Although 
teachers were affected in BC’s 1994 public sector restructuring, teachers did 
not feel its full effect for almost another decade. Instead, they enjoyed a period 
of reprieve lasting the remainder of the 1990s by going around the school 
boards’ bargaining agent to negotiate directly with government. Not until 
2002, and a new Liberal government, did teachers feel the weight of restraint 
and consolidation, which persisted until the new era of realignment beginning 
in 2007.
It remains to be seen how bctf will fare as the new boundaries of govern-
ment control over public sector labour relations continue to be clarified in 
this era of realignment. However, history suggests that, through its capacity to 
adapt to change and adversity, as well as its willingness to challenge conven-
tional approaches to collective bargaining and its limitations, the bctf will 
continue to be a staunch advocate of teachers’ rights and entitlements. The 
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation has proven to be an imaginative and 
effective voice within public sector unionism, often posing formidable chal-
lenges to provincial governments, whatever their political orientation.
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